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Article 5

JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., ON THE CATHOLIC
CONSCIENCE AND WAR: NEGRE V. LARSEN
CharlesJ. Reid, Jr.--INTRODUCTION

In his landmark work, TIze Lustre of Our Countyy, and in his
casebook, The Believer and thw Powers that Are,2 Judge John T. Noonan,

Jr., examines the historical development of the relationship between
the religious conscience and state power.3 Noonan makes clear that
at the heart ofJames Madison's belief in religious liberty is the princi-

ple that the obligations of faith must have priority over the demands
of the state.4 In this regard, Madison is taken as a linear descendant
of St. Peter, who responded to the Sanhedrin when he was forbidden
to teach in Christ's name, "We must obey God rather than man."5

The demands of the state on conscience are rarely greater than
in time of war, when the vital interests of the civil community, indeed,

even its survival, may be threatened by external foes. Hans Morgenthau has referred to "the nation as the supreme authority... within a
certain territory,"6 and to those who see no higher good than the corn*
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Jr., is Research Associate in Law and History at Emory University School of Law. He
would like to thank Richard Harrington, Stuart Land, tie Honorable John T.
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Negre v.Larsen. He would also like to thank Kathleen Brady and John Witte, Jr., for
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1 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusTRE OF OUR COUNTRY- TiE AMIFAQN EXPERIEN E OF REUIGIOUS FREoiOi (1998).
2 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE PoWERs THLT ARt GSES, Hisronv
AND OTHER DATA BEaRN'G ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION ,ND GoVERNMENr (1987).

3 See CharlesJ. Reid,Jr., The FundarmentalFredo.in:JudgeJohnT. NoonanJr. 'sHistoriography of Religious Liberty, 83 MARQ. L.RE" 367 (1999).
4

See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 61-91.

5

Acts 5:29.

6

HANS J. MORGENTHAU, PoLncs AMoNG NxioNs: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWE.R

AND PEACE 318 (5th ed. 1978).
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munity's own interests, it is assumed that the state has the final authority to call upon its citizenry to assist in the national defense. 7 The
religious believer, however, by virtue of the relationship he has with
the Divine, must respond to a different set of authorities when deciding whether to take up arms.
Catholic just-war theory, throughout its long history, has required
believers conscientiously to scrutinize the morality of state decisions in
favor of war and to refrain from participating in conflicts that are unjust either as to ends or means.8 The American Catholic Bishops have
taught that "[t] he Christian has no choice but to defend peace, properly understood, against aggression. This is an inalienable obligation."9 But they have also "affirm[ed] the Catholic teaching that the
state's decision to use force should always be morally scrutinized by
the citizens asked to support the decision or to participate in war."",
This responsibility is particularly acute in representative democracies,
in which the citizenry as a whole is obligated to be well-informed on
matters of war and peace and should properly share in the guilt
should they allow the governors to transgress moral norms.11
The Vietnam War era case of Negre v. Larsen12 presents in particularly vivid fashion the clash between the military demands of a state at
7 This is the significance of Oliver Wendell Holmes's analogy to military service
in his decision upholding forced sterilizations. "We have seen more than once that
the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives." Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
8 John P. Langan, The Good of Selective Conscientious Objection, in SELEG'IIVE CON,
SCIENTIOUS OBJECrION: ACcOMMODATING CONSCIENCE AND SECURITY 89, 98 (Michael F.
Noone, Jr. ed., 1989).

The possibility of selective conscientious objection is built into the structure
ofjust-ivar theory at least in the sense that it alvays contains the possibility of
judging that a particular war is not morallyjustifiable because it fails to meet
one or more of the norms laid down in the theory and that therefore an
individual applying the theory will judge that it is not morally right for him
or her to participate in the war, at least as a combatant.
Id.
9 Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and
OurResponse, in 4 PAsToRAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BisioPs 493,
512 (HughJ. Nolan ed., 1984). The bishops include pacifism, properly understood,
as a legitimate means of defending against aggression. Id. at 512-13.
10 Admin. Bd., U.S. Catholic Conference, Statement on Registration and Conscription

for Military Service, in 4 PAsTORAL

LETTERS OF THE UNITED

STATEs

GT-OLIC

Bistioi's,

supra note 9, at 360, 361.
11

See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST W3ARs:

A MoRAL

ARGUMENT WIT

His.

296-300 (1977); Frederick H. Russell, The HistoricalPerspective
of the Bishops' PastoralLetter: The Viev of One Medievalist, in PEACE IN A NucmxR AGE:

TORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS

THE BISHOPS' PASToRAL LETEIR IN PERSPECIVE

12 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

86,

96 (CharlesJ. Reid,Jr., ed., 1986).
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war and the scruples of a Catholic conscientious objector. Louis
Negre, the petitioner, took his case ultimately to the United States
Supreme Court, where he was represented, in part, byJohn Noonan,
who authored a brief articulating the demands made by Catholicjustwar thought on the individual conscience.1 3 Not only states but also
individual believers are bound by the requirement to scrutinize the
morality of armed conflict, Noonan argued, and to object when the
cause is seen to be unjust. 14 This obligation of conscience, Noonan
concluded, should accordingly be recognized as part of the American
doctrine of religious liberty. 15
This Article examines Judge Noonan's contribution to the late
1960s/early 1970s debate over the claim made by many Catholics of a
right to object selectively to service in the Vietnam War on just-war
grounds. The shape and substance of the Article draw inspiration
from the methodology pioneered by Judge Noonan in his own pathbreaking works of legal history. That methodology, which combines

an intense interest in contextuality and contingency ith a panoramic
understanding of the way in which a given case or incident fits within
a larger moral or legal tradition, informs in particularJudge Noonan's
later historical works, especially Powerto Dissolve,16 Personsand Masks of
the Law,a7 The Antelope,'8 Bribes,'9 and Lustre of Our Couniy.v- In these
works and others, Judge Noonan has sought to understand not only
the development of doctrine, but also the role played by individualslitigants and lawyers, policy-makers and judges, teachers, scholars,
playwrights, and the literate public-in giving form and life to
doctrine.
In undertaking an examination of the Negre case, this Article will
consider profound questions of constitutional law, involving, on the
one hand, Congress's power to raise armies and, on the other, the
First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty. It will also consider
questions of Catholic moral teaching. From earliest times, Catholic
theologians and canonists cast a suspicious eye on Warfare and sought
13 See infra notes 443-80 and accompanying text.
14 Id
15 Id.
16 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PoWER TO DISSOLVE: LV¢,-antS
COURTS OF THE RoiAN CURIA (1972).
17 JOHN

T. NOONAN,JR.,

PERSONS AND MLISK OF THE Lx

FERSON, AND W'1 THE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS

18

JOHN

T.

NOONAN,

JR.,

AND

MIRRIAGES IN THE

QuR.ozo, HOLtMS,JEF-

(1976).

THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RE Cu, RED AFrF.
AD. lts (1977).

CANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OFJAMES MONROE AND JO N QLyi.NC,

19 JOHN T. NooNAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
20 NooNAN, supra note 1.
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to put limits around its use. Deeply indebted to the lessons Judge
Noonan has taught us on the proper way to write legal history, this
Article will, above all, consider the interaction of persons with the requirements of conscience and the demands of law, in a leading antiwar case of the late 1960s.
I.

"I MUST

Louis

OBEY THE ORDER OF CONSCIENCE": THE FORMATION OF

NEGRE'S CONSCIENCE AND THE DEMANDS OF THE

PoWIERS THAT ARE

Louis Auguste Negre was born in Nice, France in July 1947 and
immigrated with his parents to the United States in 1952, where they
settled in Bakersfield, California. 2 1 Louis's parents, Auguste and
Martha, had been opposed to France's involvement in the Indo-China
War and decided to resettle in the United States in part to protect
young Louis from participation in "such an atrocity." 22 They provided

a Catholic education for their son because they believed that only a
proper religious formation would equip him for the responsibilities of
adulthood. 23 Young Louis graduated from Catholic grade school and
Catholic high school and practiced his religion faithfully throughout
adolescence and young adulthood.2 4 He was conscientious in his
dealings with others, never running afoul of the law and impressing
his employers with his reliability, courtesy, and punctuality. 25 Negre
himself emphasized his faithfulness to the Church's magisterium as
the mainstay of his life: "I have always been taught and I firmly believe
that teaching of the Popes of the Church in matters of religious faith
21

See Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under

AR 635-20, reprintedin Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (No. 325).

22

Id. at 10; see also Letter from Ronald K.Van Wert, Captain, Assistant StaffJudge

Advocate United States Army, to Chief Overseas Replacement Station, United States
Army Personnel Center (Jan. 28, 1969), ripintedin Appendix to Petition for Writ of

Certiorari at 37, Negre (No. 325) (indicating that Negre's family left France "due to
the 'atrocities' in Vietnam").

23 See Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under
AR 635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Negre (No,
325) (letter from Auguste and Martha P. Negre).
24 Id. at 31 (letter from John E.Cottalorda (June 23, 1968)). An uncle, John
Cottalorda wrote, "Louis has always given complete satisfaction to his parents, being
[a] good worker, obedient, sincere, very reliable and above all very religious, he practices his religion very well, always attending Church Services and taking his communion regularly." Id.
25 Id. at 30 (letter from Mrs. Martin F. Jaussand).
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and morals is binding upon all Catholics, clergy or laity, military or
26
civilian."
Negre was inducted into the United States Army on August 30,
1967, and made clear during his training that he was opposed on religious reasons to the military involvement in Vietnam. 2 7 On February
26, 1968, Negre "submitted an incomplete application for discharge
as a conscientious objector," which was rejected by the Army.2 8 Negre
subsequently filed a completed application on July 15 of that year."
Negre acted after consulting with Fr. James Straukarnp, SJ., of the
University of San Francisco, who wrote in support of Negre's application that he had advised Negre "that under the beliefs and teaching of
the Catholic Church he is obliged to examine and form his own conscience in respect to participating or refusing to participate in the war
at this time."30 After examining his conscience, Fr. Straukamp advised
him, he was obliged to follow it.3 1 Straukamp remembered Negre's
response was that "after earnest and prayerful consideration after he
had entered the Army, that it was clear to him that in conscience he
could not in conformity to the Catholic training and belief participate
32
in war in any form at this time."
When Negre persisted in asserting his conscientious objector
claims, he was temporarily put under arrest, threatened with judicial

proceedings, and finally subjected to court martial.33 Ilen not imprisoned, Negre continued to serve the Army in non-combatant
roles.3 4 Sergeant Robert Land, his supervisor at the Presidio, where
Negre worked as a clerk in the fall of 1968, wrote that he found Negre

26 Id. at 10.
27 See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Negre v. Larsen (N.D. Cal. 1969), reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 42, Negre (No. 325).
28 Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under AR
635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2. Negre (No. 325).
29 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Negre v. Larsen (N.D. Cal. 1969), rprinted
in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 43, Negre (No. 325).
30 Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under AR
635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Negre (No. 325)
(letter fromJames E. Straukamp, SJ., dated May 2, 1968).
31 "I counseled Private Negre that he was obliged to form his ownm conscience
after giving all deference to the information and advice of the duly constituted government authorities and other persons, and that under Catholic doctrine he would be
in religious duty bound to act in conformity to his conscience ...

32 Id. at 28.
33 Id. at 2-3.
34 Id at 12.

."

Id.
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be of the highest caliber, his efficiency and his devotion to duty
35
also to be of the highest caliber."
Negre's second application for conscientious objector status, of
July 1968, was rejected on August 9.36 He was then ordered to Vietnam, and when he refused that order "based upon his religious training and belief,"3 7 "[g]eneral court martial charges were preferred
against petitioner for disobedience of orders."3 8 At court martial,
Negre was represented by Richard Harrington, of the San Francisco
firm of Athearn, Chandler, and Hoffman, a general civil practice firm
specializing in corporation, probate, and tax law. 39 Negre had been
referred to Harrington by a relative who had previously retained
him. 40 Harrington himself had graduated from Harvard Law School
in 1953 and had also served in the Army Judge Advocates General
Corps from 1954 to 1957. 4 1 Unsure of the theological foundations of
Negre's claim, Harrington consulted John Noonan, an acquaintance
of his from the HarvardLaw Review and a 1954 graduate of Harvard
"to

Law School then teaching at Boalt Hall. 4 2

Noonan referred him to

the writings of Thomas Aquinas and other Catholic sources on just
43
war.
At trial Harrington contended "that Negre had a privilege to refuse to participate in war crimes, and that his belief that participation
in war in Vietnam would constitute a crime would be privileged as a
mistake of fact if reasonably based upon reported facts, even if mis-

taken."44 Harrington "also relied upon Negre's conscientious objection defense and relied upon the findings of Negre's religious
sincerity by the Army chaplain who had interviewed Negre.'
Assist-

ing Harrington at trial were Richard Buxbaum, a professor of Boalt
Hall, and Frank Newman, Boalt Hall's dean. 46 Negre was acquitted of
the charges onJanuary 22, 1969, "the first acquittal by a general court
35 Id. at 36 (deposition of Robert R. Land (Jan. 25, 1969)).
36 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Negre v. Larsen (N.D. Cal. 1969), reprinted
in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 43, Negre (No. 325).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 1 MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIREcToRY 1192B (1970).
40 Letter from Richard Harrington to Dr. CharlesJ. Reid, Jr. 2 (Nov. 8, 2000) (on
file with author).
41 1 MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DiRnaroRy 1193B (1970).
42 Letter from John T. Noonan, United States Circuit Judge, to Dr. Charles J.
Reid, Jr. (Nov. 28, 2000) (on file with author).
43 Letter from Richard Harrington to Dr. CharlesJ. Reid, Jr., supra note 40, at 2.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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martial at the Presidio within the memory of the people [Harrington]
spoke with. "47 Negre's application for discharge, however, was once
again denied, and he was ordered to report to the Overseas Replacement Station at Oakland, California, "for transshipment to Vietnam,"

even though he had not been "give[n] ... witten orders to that ef-

fect."48 Negre responded by seeking his release from the Army by writ
49
of habeas corpus.
In his application for conscientious objector status, Negre based
his objection on two pillars: the sacrosanct nature of conscience, as
found in the Catholic tradition; and the teaching of the Church on
the subject of just and unjust war, particularly in light of the new
moral situation brought about by the development of weapons of mass
50
destruction in the modem age.
For his understanding of the obligations of the Catholic conscience, Negre relied on Austin Fagothey's treatment of the subject in
his Right and Reason,5 ' a popular introduction to Catholic moral philosophy then in its fourth edition. Negre included excerpts from this
work in his application for conscientious objector status, beginning
with the section "Always Obey a Certain Conscience."5 2 By "certain
conscience," Fagothey meant not an objectively correct assessment of
the morality of a given situation, but "the subjective state of the person
judging, how firmly he holds to his assent, how thoroughly he has
excluded fear of the opposite."5 3 Following traditional principles,
Fagothey distinguished between vincible error, where the actor has
reason to believe he might be wrong, and invincible error, where the
actor is subjectively convinced of the correctness of his conscientiously-made decision, even though his conclusions might objectively
be in error.5 4 An actor in a state of invincible error is obliged to follow the dictates of conscience, since he is in a state of conscientious
47 Id. at 3 n.3.

48 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Negre v. Larsen (N.D. Cal. 1969), reprinted
in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 44, Negre %.Larsen, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (No. 325).
49

Seeid.

50 See Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under
AR 635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ngre (No. 325).
51

AusTN FAGOTHEY, RIGHT AND

RFSON: ETHICS IN THEORYAND

PmRTIcE (4th ed.

1967).
52 Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under AR
635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, .\$gre (No. 325).
53 FAGOTHE', supra note 51, at 37.
54 Id. at 38.
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certitude; "If a man is firmly convinced that his action is right, he is
choosing the good as far as he can .... 55
The doctrine of invincible error, however, does not mean that
one is excused from examining the morality of a proposed course of
action. Catholics are obliged to show the same seriousness in scrutinizing moral matters that businesspersons or lawyers use in charting
courses of professional dealings.5 6 Through a process of inquiry that
involves determining the facts of a case at hand and the principles to
be applied to that case one forms one's conscience.5 7 Two principles
to be employed in forming one's conscience are: "(1) Take the morally safer course. (2) A doubtful law does not bind."5 8 Fagothey explains what is meant by doubtful law: "Law imposes obligation, which
is usually burdensome, and he who would impose an obligation or
restrict the liberty of another must prove his right to do so."9 Subsequently, in a section on civil disobedience and the right of revolution,
Fagothey added and Negre quoted: "What may a private citizen do
when he is unjustly oppressed? Unjust laws are not laws at all and can
impose no moral obligation. Injustice in a law must not lightly be
presumed but clearly established."6 0
Negre also looked to recent Church teaching on the inviolability
of conscience. He cited Gaudium et Spes:
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does
not impose on himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always
summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience
when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has
in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the will and dignity of
man; according [to] it he will be judged. Conscience is the most
secret core and sanctuary of man. There he is alone with God,
whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience reveals that law which is fulfilled by love of God and
61
neighbor.
55
56
57
58

Id.
See id-at 39.
See id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.

59

Id. at 41.

60 Id. at 346; see also Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious
Objector Under AR 635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
24, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (No. 325) (containing Negre's summary of
Fagothey's teaching on "rebellion and revolution").
61 Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under AR
635-20, reprintedin Appendix-to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Negre (No. 325)
(quoting VATICAN COUNCIL II, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH AND THE
MODERN WORLD [Gaudium et Spes] 80 (Nat'l Catholic Welfare Conference ed., 1965)
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This background shaped Negre's own decision to disobey when

ordered to proceed to Vietnam. As a Catholic, Negre asserted, he wras
under a duty to form and shape his conscience so as to remove
doubt.62 "I cannot be willing to commit evil by acting with a doubtful
conscience, merely hoping that my conduct is not contrary to conscience." 63 Negre conceded that other Catholics might reach a conclusion opposite his own and that he might be in a state of invincible
error, but he emphasized that his obligation was to remain true to the
moral conclusions he had reached. 64 As Negre put it, "I must obey
65
the order of conscience."
For his moral conclusions about warfare, Negre drew, for the
most part, on then-recent teachings of the Second Vatican Council,
the Bible, as well as Pope John XXIII, Pope Paul VI, and Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani. Negre quoted from Gaudium et Spes's assessment that
modem war had become qualitatively different as the result of "[tihe
development of armaments by modem science."6G He noted as well
Gaudium et Spes's conclusion that in the light of new military technologies the morality of warfare must be "evaluat[ed] ... with an entirely
new attitude."67 Negre also quoted from Paul VI's 1965 speech at the
United Nations: "If you wish to be brother[s], let the weapons fall
from your hands .... No more war. War never again."68
Other texts Negre relied upon similarly pointed to the extreme
difficulty of waging just war in an era dominated by weapons of mass
destruction. He began his section on "Revelation" with the commandment of the Decalogue, "You shall not kill."6 9 He continued with a
number of quotations from the New Testament emphasizing Jesus's
[hereinafter Gaudium et Spes]); see also VATICaN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILLIR AzND POST
Docuiwrs 916 (Austin Flannery ed., 1975) (providing text of Guadilm el
Spes).
CONCILIAR

62 See Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under
AR 635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Negre (No.

325).
63 Id.
64 See id. at 4.

65
66

d. at 10.
Id. at 8 (citing Gaudium et Spes, supra note 61,

80);

THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR Doctumiurs, supranote
of Gaudium et Spes).

Cf. VATICN COUNCL

II:

61, at 989 (providing text

67 Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under AR
635-20, repinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Negre (No. 325)
(citing Gaudium et Spes, supra note 61, 80).
68

Id. at 7.

69 Id- at 6 (quoting Exodus 20:23).
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teachings that one should turn one's cheek when struck, 70 that one

should love one's enemies, 71 and that "all that take the sword shall
perish with the sword." 72 Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani's judgment that
modern conditions can never "fulfill [those] conditions which in theory make war lawful and just,"73 as well as Pope John XXIII's conclusion that "in this age of ours which prides itself on its atomic power, it
is irrational to believe that war is still an apt means of vindicating violated rights," 74 were both quoted by Negre to support his objections.
Negre gave relatively little attention to the Church's continued acknowledgement that just war was possible, although he did refer obliquely to Gaudium et Spes's distinction between wars of self-defense
75
and wars of aggression.
Negre went on to characterize the war in Vietnam as an act of
aggression on the part of the United States. Negre explained the war

as an ideological conflict between two sides committed to different
belief systems:
In pertaining to the war in Vietnam the North Vietnamese people
are fighting for their fundamental beliefs which they were brought
up to believe. According to our standards they are wrong in their
action, but in reality who is to say which nation is right in their beliefs before God. Sure we can say we are right and they are wrong in
their action, but one cannot forget that they too are human beings
as ourselves and have the right to form opinions and make decisions
as we are capable of doing. Now if they are wrong in their actions,
surely they will pay, if not in this life in the world to come, for their
misdeeds, just as we will if we are wrong. The fact still remains that
70
71
72
73

Id. (quoting Matthew 5:38-39).
Id. (quoting Matthew 5:43-44).
Id. at 7 (quoting Matthew 22:52).
Id. (quoting Mgr. Alfred Cardinal Ottaviani, The Future of Offensive War, 30
BLAcrKIARs 415, 419 (1949)).
74 Id. (quoting POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRis 127 (1963)); see also Ttic
GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE: CATHoLIC SOCIAL TEAcHING SINCE POPE JOHN 227 (Joseph Gremillion ed., 1976).
75 Negre quoted, "But it is one thing to undertake military action for the just
defense of the people, and something else again to seek the subjugation of other
nations." Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector 'Under
AR635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Negre (No. 325)
(citing Gaudium et Spes, supra note 61, at
79); see also VATICAN COUNCIL II: TilLa
CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS, supranote 61, at 989 (providing text of
Gaudium et Spes). Omitted is Gaudium et Spes's assertion that "[w] ar, of course, has not
ceased to be part of the human scene. As long as the danger of war persists and there
is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments
cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed."
Id. at 988-89.
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we have no authority to condemn them in their actions or pressure
them by fighting and killing them.... [W,]ar is no answer to peace.
War only solves the point of which country is stronger. Despite the
amount of force used on an individual, his basic beliefs will always
remain, just as long as he has an ounce of breath in him and he
76
really believes it without doubt
Inexpertly written, heartfelt in its convictions, Negre's condemnation of the Vietnam War as unjust spoke to the impossibility of alter-

ing another person's conscience by force of arms. Had Negre chosen
to make explicit use ofjust-war criteria in his analysis, he might have
said that American involvement lacked a just cause. The Vietnam
Conflict was wrong, on this account, because it wvas an attempt to win

over hearts and minds not by persuasion, but by military superiority.
II.

"THE DoMIN OF POWER AND THE FORUM OF CONSCIENCE": THE
STATE OF THE LAW OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The earliest organic documents and laws of the American nation
made provision for conscientious objectors. Thus the resolution of

July 18, 1775, of the Continental Congress "recommend~ing that] the
inhabitants of all the united English Colonies in North America" 7" organize militias to resist British forces also admonished tie colonies to
make appropriate provision for those "who, from religious principles,
in any case." 78 Similarly, revolutionary-era constitucannot bear ans

tions of several states also provided for the protection of those who
could not conscientiously take up arms. Thus the Pennsylania Constitution of 1776 provided that "[no] man who is conscientiously
scrupulous of bearing arms [can] be justly compelled thereto." 79 The

Vermont Constitution of 1777 repeated this language,8 0 while the
New York Constitution of 1777 exempted Quakers from military service. 81 Many of those States that did not constitutionally protect those
76 Application for Request for Discharge as a Conscientious Objector Under AR
635-20, reprinted in Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Negre (No. 325).

77

2JouRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

(1774-1789) 187 (1905).

78 Id. at 189. The Resolution continued by asserting that "this Congress intends
no violence to their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute
liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren."
Id.
79 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 1, § 8, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERALXAND STATE Coxsrrrc.
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHE ORGANIC Lws 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909).
80 VT. CONSr. of 1777, ch. 1, § 9, reprinted in 6 THE FED L AND ST,TE Cosmrrr!TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORCrANc Lkws, supra note 79, at 3741.
81 N.Y. CONsT. of 1777, § 40, reprinted in 5 THE FEDmLu. D STATE CoNsTrrT.
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AN OTHER ORGANiC LANs, supra note 79, at 2637.
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objecting to military service did so by statute.8 2 The value being protected in these documents was the free religious conscience, even in a

war fought on American soil, involving the very survival of the new
83
nation.
The balance struck in favor of the conscientious objector was only
imperfectly recognized, however, in eighteenth-century law and practice. The state constitutions that allowed for conscientious objection
also required the payment of a "fine" or the recruitment of a replace-

ment who could serve in the objector's stead.84 Many Mennonites,
Moravians, Quakers, and others found this qualification odious, believing that they should not be required to serve personally or even
help to finance a war that violated their consciences. 85 Some were

86
jailed or forfeited their property for refusal to comply.

In June 1789, James Madison added to a draft of what would become the Second Amendment a clause stating "no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person. '8 7 An amended version of this text was debated on

August 17, 1789 and ultimately defeated.88 The reasons for the defeat
were multiple. Elbridge Gerry attacked the proposed language as
likely to destroy the integrity of the state militias and thereby undermine the relationship of state and federal power.8 9 James Jackson of
82

See FrancisJ. Conklin, ConscientiousObjectorProvisions:A View in the Light ofTor-

caso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. LJ. 252, 256-58 (1963) (collecting and analyzing these
texts).
83 Ellis West's recent study of conscientious objection in the Revolutionary War
era, Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of
Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10J.L. & RELGION 367 (1994), is flawed because

of its essentially presentist concerns. West is preoccupied with demonstrating the correctness of the majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
and asks the sources a set of essentially anachronistic questions of much greater relevance to twentieth-century jurisprudence than to eighteenth-century reality.
84 See West, supra note 83, at 379.
85 See PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE COLONIAL Ella TO
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 210-22 (1968); RICHARD K. MACMASTER, LmND, PIET, PEOPLEHOOD: THE ESTABUSHMENT OF MENNONITE COMMUNITIES IN AmERI(CA 1683-1790,

at 249-80 (1985).
86 See BROcK, supra note 85, at 240-54, 262-65.
87 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
88 The amended version read: "[N~o person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." Id. at 749.
89 Id. at 749-50.
Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to
the people in power to destroy the Constitution itself. They can declare who
are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms.
What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a stand-
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Georgia proposed amending the language to require those exempted
by the provision to "pay[] an equivalent," 90 a motion that was opposed
by Roger Sherman, who argued that such language wnas futile, since
"those who are religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, are equally
scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an equivalent."9 1 Egbert
Benson of New York, finally, proposed striking the language altogether, arguing that such exemptions should be left to the determina92
tion of the legislature.
These developments in the law occurred against a social backdrop in which conscription, in reality, played a minimal role. The
ing army, the bane of liberty. Now, it must be evident, that, under this provision, together with their other powers, Congress could take such measures
with respect to a militia, as to make a standing army necessary. Whenever
Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people, they
always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army upon their
ruins.
Id. Gerry went on to propose that the Bill of Rights protect "persons belonging to a
religious sect scrupulous of bearing arms." Id. at 750. In interpreting Gerry's remarks, one must bear in mind that the debate over conscientious objection occurs in
the context of the Second Amendment, with its suspicion of standing armies and its
vision of "a system of cooperative federalism designed to maintain the integrity of tie
militia" as "the best 'security of a free State.'" AHuIL REED ALut, TnE Bu OF RIGrrs:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCION

54 (1998) (quoting U.S. Co-sr. amend. II); see also

David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizn Militia: The Tenmjing Scond
Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991) (exploring the purpose of the Second Amendment in the context of civic republicanism and the militia debate).

90 1 ANNALS or CONG. 750 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
91

Id
92

Id. The account of Sherman's statement continues:
Many of them would rather die than do either one or the other [retain a
substitute or pay an equivalent]; but he did not see an absolute necessity for
a clause of this kind. We do not live under an arbitrary Government, said
he, and the States, respectively, will have the government of the militia, unless when called into actual service ....
Id. at 751.
He would always leave it to the benevolence of the Legislature, for,
modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a manner as
to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this indulgence of right. It
may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought
to be left to the discretion of the Government. If this stands part of the
Constitution, it will be a question before the Judiciary on every regulation
you make with respect to the organization of the militia, whether it comports
with this declaration or not....

I have no reason to believe but tie Legislature vdil always possess humanity to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but
they ought to be left to their discretion.
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Continental Army of Revolutionary War fame was at least in its early
years largely a volunteer force, recruited by the various States.93 "Difficulties in sustaining the ranks of the Continental Army led many states
to augment recruiting efforts with drafts or, more frequently, with
draft-induced substitutions," but these efforts were often intended
more as a means to raise revenue than supply manpower needs
94

directly.

Indeed, some politicians and statesmen questioned whether conscription was compatible with a free Republic. In 1787, Edmund Randolph was recorded as stating "Draughts stretch the strings of
government too violently to be adopted."9 5 In reflecting back on the

Confederation period, Alexander Hamilton wrote obliquely of conscription as "those oppressive expedients for raising men which were
upon several occasions practised."9 6 The debate over the congressional power to raise armies found in the ratifying conventions cen7
tered on the advisability of standing armies, not on conscription.'
When war broke out with Britain in 1812, the subject of conscription
93 See JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, To RAISE AN ARMY. THE DRAFr CoMuEs ro
MODERN AMERICA 21-22 (1987); JAMES KIRBY MARTIN & MARTIN EDWARD LENDER, A
RESPECTABLE ApmrM: THE MILTrrARY ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-1789, at 88-91
(1982).
94 CHAMBERS, supra note 93, at 22. Chambers writes, "The widespread use of
state drafts to maintain the Continental Army in the late 1770s appears, in practice, to
have been New England-style 'quasi-drafts,' in which local militia officers 'drafted'
affluent militiamen who then hired substitutes to serve for them in the Continental
Army." Id.
95 Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATnE OF THE FORZMATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN STATES 923,
924 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927). In James Madison's account of this speech, Randolph is recorded as asserting that since "neither militia nor draughts being fit for
defence" it was necessary to empower the federal government to raise money to pay
for "enlistments." Notes ofJames Madison, reprinted in 1 THE RECORDS OF TIlE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also Charles A.
Lofgren, Compulsory Military Service Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
33 Wm.& MARY Q. 61, 68-69 (1976).
96 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). Although Hamilton spoke of the federal "power to levy troops" in THE FEDER.
AusT No. 23, supra, at 148, Lofgren makes clear that Hamilton did not intend by the
word "levy" the power to conscript. See Lofgren, supra note 95, at 69 n.28.
97 See Bernard Donahoe & Marshall Smelser, The CongressionalPower to Raise Armiks: The Constitutionaland Ratifing Conventions, 1787-1788, 33 REv. POL. 202, 204-10
(1971). Rhode Island proposed an amendment to the Constitution: "That no person
shall be compelled to do military duty otherwise than by voluntary enlistment, except
in cases of general invasion." Lofgren, supra note 95, at 84; see also 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

244 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836);

ARTHUR

A. EKIRCH, JR.,
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was raised and debated seriously. 98 James Monroe, President
Madison's Secretary of War, proposed "[n]ational conscription [as]
an emergency measurejustified by military necessity and the inherent
right of government to defend the community" 99 and was opposed in
his efforts by Daniel Webster, who denounced the plan as an unconstitutional act of "despotism."10 0 The constitutional grant to Congress of
the power to raise armies, Webster contended, should be "construed
upon free principles," which exclude the possibility of conscription.10 1
"The nation," Webster concluded, "is not yet in a temper to submit to
conscription. The people have too fresh [and] strong a feeling of the

blessings of civil liberty to be willing thus to surrender

°
it."102

It was only in 1863, at the height of the Civil War, that an effective
conscription law was enacted by the federal government. 10 3 The 1863
27-28 (1956) (noting North Carolina and Rhode Island support for religious
exemptions to military service).
98 See CHmBERs, supra note 93, at 33-34.
99 Id.
100 DANIEL WEBSrER, Address to the House of Representatives on the Conscription
Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), in THE LE-rEns OF DANLmt. WEBsr 56, 61 (C.H. van T)ne ed.,
1902).
The administration asserts the right to fill the ranks of the regular army
by compulsion. It contends that it may now take one out of every twenty-five
men, & any part or the whole of the rest, whenever its occasions require.
Persons thus taken by force, & put into an army, may be compelled to serve

TARY

there, during the war, or for life. They may be put on any service, at home
or abroad, for defence or for invasion, according to the will & pleasure of
Government. This power does not grow out of any invasion of the country.
or even out of a state of war. It belongs to Government at all times, in peace
as well as in war, & is to be exercised under all circumstances, according to
its mere discretion....
Is this, Sir, consistent with the character of a free Government:, Is this
civil liberty? Is this the real character of our Constitution? No, Sir, indeed it
is not. The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled. The people of this country have not established for themselves such a fabric of despotism.
Id.
101 Id. at 63.
102 Id. at 67. Several competing conscription bills were brought before Congress,
but none were enacted. See Am.tAR, supra note 89, at 58. Amar reads the Second
Amendment debate, together with the debate over conscription in the War of 1812, as
denying to Congress, on originalist grounds, the power to conscript, although he asserts that "the Fourteenth Amendment reflected a much more s)mpathetic view of a
national army and a much more skeptical view of state-organized militias." Id. at 59.
103 See CHAmEnPS, supra note 93, at 50-55. Chambers notes that Lincoln's efforts
to institute a draft were opposed not only by northern peace Democrats but also by
many Republicans who feared the loss of industrial manpower and the rise of "immense standing armies" that threatened to "undermine all our republican foundations." Id. at 50-51 (quoting Letter from Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to his father
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version of the law did not allow for conscientious objection, although
it permitted the hiring of substitutes. 0 4 An 1864 amendment to the
Draft Act allowed for conscientious objection. 05 With the victory of
Union forces in 1865, the draft lapsed until the American entry into
World War I in 1917, when a Selective Draft Act was passed, which
established a program of national conscription on premises that differed from what had gone before.' 0 6 "Each person subject to the Act
was personally and absolutely liable for service with the national
forces.' u0 7 One could no longer hire a substitute or pay a commutation fee and thereby-avoid one's military obligation. The 1917 Act,
like its predecessor Civil War Act, also made allowance for conscientious objection.' 0 8 Challenged in the courts, the statute was upheld by
(July 16, 1862), in 1 A CYCLE OF ADAMS LETrvaus 1861-1865, at 165 (W.C. Ford ed.,
1920)); see alsojAmEs W. GEARY,WE NEED MEN: THE UNION DRAFr IN THE CIVIL WAR
(1991); EUGENE C. MURDOCK, ONE MILLION MEN: THE CIVIL WAR DR, rIN TI-E NoaiII
(1971) (both texts are standard histories of the enactment and implementation of the
draft in the Union).
104 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 733 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (1994)); see R.R. Russell, Development of Conscientious ObjectorRecognition in the
United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 418 (1952). The Confederacy also implemented a draft, although, like its northern equivalent, it encountered sometimes stiff
resistance. See generally ALBERT B. MOORE, CONSCRIPTION AND CONFLIG'I IN THE CON.
FEDERACY

105

(1924).

The 1864 amendment provided:
That members of religious denominations, who shall by oath or affirmation
declare that they are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and
who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious denominations, shall, when drafted into the military
service, be considered noncombatants, and shall be assigned by the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, or to the care of freedmen, or shall pay
the sum of three hundred dollars... to be applied to the benefit of the sick
and wounded soldiers ....
Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j)
(1994)).
106 See Russell, supra note 104, at 420.
107 Id.
108 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (current version at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 456(j) (1994)).
[N] othing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any
person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a
member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization ...whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any
form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation
therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations, but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any
capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant ....
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a unanimous Supreme Court, with Chief'Justice Edward White authoring the opinion.10 9
In 1931 the question of selective conscientious objection w-as
presented to the Court in the context of a naturalization case.110
Douglas Macintosh was a Canadian national who received a graduate
degree in theology from the University of Chicago and taught at Yale
Divinity School until shortly after the outbreak of World War I, when
he enlisted as a chaplain in the Canadian Army and saw service at the
Battle of the Somme."' He resumed his duties at Yale University following the armistice and filed a petition for naturalization that was
acted upon in the spring of 1929.112 When asked routinely "whether
he was willing to take up arms in defense" of the United States, Macintosh responded, "Yes, but I should want to be free to judge of the
necessity."' 13 The hearing examiner rejected his application, a decision upheld by the federal district court,1 4 but reversed on appeal to
the Second Circuit." 5
In a brief signed byJohn W. Davis, the "lawyer's lawyer" who had
been the Democratic nominee for President in 1924, and by Charles
E. Clark, the Dean of the Yale Law School, father of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and future federal judge, among others," 6 it was
Id. Russell notes, "This strict religious sect requirement was somewhat ameliorated by

executive order and administrative regulation." Russell, supra note 104, at 421.
109 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). White frontally challenged tie

old republican tradition of voluntary military senice in his reasoning that the powver
to raise armies entrusted to Congress must have implicit within it the power to draft.
"[A] government power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be
exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a
power." Id. at 378.
110 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
111 Brief for Respondent at 4, Aladntosh (No. 504).
112 Id. at 4-5.
113 Id. at 5. Macintosh explained his refusal:
I do not undertake to support "my country right, or wrong" in any dispute
which may arise, and I am not willing to promise beforehand, and without
knowing the cause for which my country may go to war, either that I vill or
that I will not "take up arms in defense of this country," 4iowever "necessary'
the war may be to the government of the day.
Id.

114 M at 5-6.
115 Macintosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1930).
116 On the role of John W. Davis and his firm in tie handling of the case, see
Wniiur H. HARBAUGH, LA.WvtR's L.Wv
wR THE LirE OFJoIIN W. D.ws 281-97 (1973).
The other signatories, in addition to Davis and Clark, were Allen Wardwell, Davis's
partner, and W. Charles Poletti, a young associate in Davis's firm, who wns principally
responsible for drafting the brief. See id. at 287-89. Poletti later briefly served as
governor of New York. See id. at 287.
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contended that the question put to Macintosh violated the First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty.' 17 The Davis-Clark brief
quoted Joseph Story for the proposition that "[t]he rights of con1 18
science are, indeed, beyond the just reach of any human power."
In proposing a legal test for the Court to follow, the brief considered
the Mormon polygamy cases to distinguish between overt acts which
threaten "peace and good order"-such as polygamy-and affirmative
commands of government that result in the violation of conscience.Ili'
Such a distinction, the brief asserted, would allow for the possibility of
selective conscientious objection, in light of the American tradition of
recognizing such claims of conscience and also in light of American
treaty obligations, particularly the Kellogg-Briand pact, which acknowledged the possibility of unjust wars. 120 Not only the American
government, but her citizens should be allowed to act on their judgment about a given war's morality. 121 After all, the history of the First
Amendment and its interpretation by the courts leaves not "the slightest indication" that Congress may "compel a citizen to flout the will of
God and commit what in his sincere belief is none other than
22
murder."1
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by George Sutherland, whose formative years as a lawyer were spent in the Utah Terri12
tory during the closing years of the campaign against polygamy, 3
117 See generally Brief for Respondent at 4, Macintosh (No. 504).
118 Id. at 37 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 1876 (1891)).
119 Id. at 35.
120 See id. at 35-36.
121 See id. at 36.
[M]ust a Christian citizen who considers such a war [one in violation of Kellogg-Briandl not to be justified by what he earnestly believes to be the will of
God, nevertheless take up arms and fight? We hesitate to believe that the
Government seriously contends that all Christian citizens should be reduced
to conscienceless serfs.
Id.
122 Id. at 35.
123

See HADLEYARKEs, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING AJtuRSPRURIGHTS 40-49 (1994). Sutherland's father had immigrated to the

DENCE OF NATURAL

United States from England after converting to Mormonism, but subsequently lapsed.
See id. at 40. Sutherland himself was raised outside the Church but attended the
Provo Academy, the predecessor to Brigham Young University. He maintained a
warm relationship with the Church's leadership and occasionally defended the
Church's interest in court, despite his vigorous opposition to polygamy. Id. at 40-45.
As a young lawyer in the 1880s and 1890s his views on the relationship of the religious
conscience and the law must have been shaped by the campaign against polygamy,
the most important constitutional issue of the day.
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ruled by a five-to-four margin in favor of the government. 12 4 Although his judicial work is now considered an example of naturalrights jurisprudence, Sutherland's opinion in Macintosh can fairly be
described as nearly totalistic in the demands the state is empowered to
make upon the religious conscience in time of unar. 12 Constitutionally, the war power is "well-nigh limitless."12 6 "From its very nature the
war power, when necessity calls for its exercise, tolerates no qualifications or limitations .... ,,127 Against such a power the religious conscience must yield; "The conscientious objector is relieved from the
obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision,
express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded
with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him."' 2 8
Chief'Justice Charles Evans Hughes,joined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice Louis Brandeis, and Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone12 9-the weightier if not greater part of the Court-dissented.
Hughes side-stepped the conflict Sutherland's majority opinion had
set up between an all-powerful state and the individual's conscience by
distinguishing betveen tvo realms, "the domain of power" and the
"forum of conscience."1 3 0 The State is supreme in the domain of
power because "government may enforce obedience to laws regardless
of scruples," but "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral

124

See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).

125 In a work dedicated to Sutherland'sjurisprudence of natural rights, Arkes fails
even to cite Macintosh. See ARxEs, supra note 123.
126 Mfacintosh, 283 U.S. at 624.

127 Id. at 622. Sutherland continues: "unless found in the Constitution or in applicable principles of international law. In the words of John Quincy Adams-'This
power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier so
anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property and of life.'" Id. Sutherland
himself cites to no instance in which the Constitution might restrain the wnr power.

128 Id. at 623.
129

In his private capacity, Stone had written, the year after World War I ended:
[B]oth morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate the
conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the view
that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which makes it worthy
of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep in its significance and vital,
indeed, is it to the integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing
short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its violation; and it
may well be questioned whether the state which preserves its life by a settled
policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it in the process.
Harlan Fiske Stone, The Conscientious Objector,21 CoLuM. UNiv. Q. 253, 269 (1919).
130 Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
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power... has always been maintained." 13 ' Such a distinction, Hughes
continued, reflects the nature of religious liberty guaranteed by the
First Amendment. "One cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper
appreciation of its essential and historical significance, without assuming the existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will of
God.... [F] reedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate
conviction of paramount duty." 132 Focusing on the question of the
selective conscientious objector, Hughes added:
Nor is there ground, in my opinion, for the exclusion of Professor
Macintosh because his conscientious scruples have particular reference to wars believed to be unjust. There is nothing new in such an
attitude. Among the most eminent statesmen here and abroad have
been those who condemned the action of their country in entering
133
into wars they thought to be unjustified.
By 1940, however, nine years after the decision in Macintosh, with
war raging in Europe, the United States reinstituted the draft in the
Selective Service Act of that year.13 4 The Act provided for the protection of conscientious objectors in language far broader than the Civil
War or World War I statutes,13 5 although in actual operation many
more conscientious objectors were imprisoned during World War II
than during World War J.136 The constitutionality of conscription was
131 Id. Hughes added: "The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of
principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation." Id. at 633-34.
132 Id. at 634.
133 Id. at 635. In noting that there was a long tradition in the United States of
respecting conscientious objection, Hughes stated, "The Congress has sought to
avoid ...conflicts in this country by respecting our happy tradition. In no sphere of
legislation has the intention to prevent such clashes been more conspicuous than in
relation to the bearing of arms." Id. at 634.
134 See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (current
version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994)); see also GEORGE Q. FLNN, TiiE DRAYwr
1940-1973, at 9-52 (1993).
135 "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form." Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 4(g),
54 Stat. 885, 889 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994)).
136 See MuLFORn Q. SIBLEY & PHIuP E. JACOB, CONSCRIPTON OF CONSCIENCE: THE
AMiERicAN STATE AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 1940-1947, at 332 (1952).
"[A]bout nine times as many objectors were sent to prison during the Second World
War as were incarcerated during the First World War; even in proportion to the total
numbers conscripted, there were between two and three times as many." h.
Catholics made up a very small subset of the conscientious objector population. It has
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not challenged judicially during the war, although Thomas Reed Powell, Joseph Story Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, writing on
the eve of American entry into the war, in 1941, distinguished Macintosh as a naturalization case and asserted, "Notwithstanding all judicial
declarations, it has not been actually decided that a conscientious objector, not within any group exempted by Congress, can be put into
where certain refusals to
the front-line trenches or put into the army
1 37
death."
by
punished
be
obey orders may
The Selective Service Act of 1940 was superseded by a new Selective Service Act, enacted in 1948, which also accorded protection to
those "who, by reason of religious training and belief [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."' ss Paraphrasing
Hughes's dissent, Congress defined "religious training and belief" as
meaning "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Is9
The language of the 1948 Act was retained in the conscientious objector provision of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,140 which was
the statute under which Louis Negre sought protection.

Judicially, substantial development took place in the area of conscientious objection in the period between 1941 and 1970. In United
States v. Seeger,14 I the Court expanded protection to cover believers
outside the Judeo-Christian tradition by exempting from military service those whose objections could be grounded in a sincerely-held system of beliefs that filled in their lives the role played by the Supreme
Being in traditional theology. 42 In Welsh v. United States,143 the Court
been estimated that there were 135 Catholic conscientious objectors during World
War II and that sixty-one Catholic males were imprisoned as a result of their objection. See Patricia McNeal, Catholic ConscientiousObjectionDuring World Wad!I, 61 QvTH.
HtsT. RE, 222, 232 (1975); see also GORDON C. ZAHN, ANOTHER PART OF THE Wxy THE
CAMP SMION STORY (1979) (reminiscence of a Catholic pacifist during World War 11).
137 Thomas Reed Powell, Conscience and the Constitution, in D&NtocYcv AMI NAT-oNAL UNITY 1, 18 (William T. Hutchinson ed., 1941).
138 Selective Service Act of 1948 ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994)).
139 Id. Congress excluded from protection those whose objections arise from "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical vies or a merely personal moral
code." Id.
140 See Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Star. 100 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (1994)). Missing from the 1967 Act was the sentence grounding religious
training on belief in a Supreme Being, although the statute excluded from protection
those whose objections were based upon "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code." Id.
141 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
142 Id. at 173-80.
143 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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extended protection to "all those whose consciences, spurred by
deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no
rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become an instrument of
wvar."144

In United States v. Sisson,14 5 the question of selective conscientious
objection to the Vietnam War was squarely presented. John Heffron
Sisson, a 1967 graduate of Harvard College, objected on non-theistic,
conscientious grounds to induction into the United States Armed
Forces.' 46 Judge Charles Wyzanski commenced his analysis of Sisson's
case with Thomas Reed Powell's observation of twenty-eight years earlier that there was, as yet, no firm judicial authority permitting the
conscription of conscientious objectors not actually protected by Congress. 14 7 He continued by stressing that the conscientious objector
played an important role in society:
[E]very man shares and society as a whole shares an interest in the
liberty of the conscientious objector, religious or not. The freedom
of all depends on the freedom of each. Free men exist in free societies. Society's own stability and growth, its physical and spiritual
prosperity are responsive to the liberties of its citizens, to their deepest insights, to their free choices-"That which opposes, also
4 8

fits."1

Wyzanski recognized that society's interest in protecting the conscientious objector differed based on the severity of the conflict in
which it is involved, citing for authority Sutherland's majority opinion
in Macintosh.149 A war for national survival might require the overriding of conscientious scruples, "[b]ut a campaign fought with limited
forces for limited objects with no likelihood of a battlefront within this
country and without a declaration of war is not a claim of comparable
magnitude."'150 Grounding his decision on the Free Exercise Clause
144 1& at 344 (Black, J., plurality).
145 297 F. Supp. 902 (D.Mass. 1969).
146 Id.at 904-05. At trial, Sisson grounded his objections to participation in the
Vietnam War on "the U.N. Charter, the charter and judgments of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, and other domestic and international matters bearing upon the American
involvement in Vietnam." Id. at 905.
147 Id. at 908.
148 Id.
149 Wyzanski proposed that Sutherland's seemingly unrestricted doctrine of the
war power be limited by emphasizing that it is in "the last extremity" that Congress
may "compel the armed service of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or war in
general." Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24
(1931)).
150 Id. at 909.
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of the First Amendment, Wyzanski determined that the balance of interests favored Sisson. 15 ' Wyzanski concluded by observing that
[t]he true secret of legal might lies in the habits of conscientious
men disciplining themselves to obey the law they respect without
the necessity of judicial and administrative orders. When the law
treats a reasonable, conscientious act as a crime it subverts its own
power. It invites civil disobedience. 152It so impairs the very habits
which nourish and preserve the law.
Thus, as Negre's case made its way in the courts, two alternative
constitutional traditions were clearly available. One tradition, firmly
grounded in the statist reasoning of the Selective Draft Act Casesand the
majority opinion of United States v. Macintosh, stressed the potentially
limitless demands the state might make upon each of its citizens. The

war power, inSutherland's estimation, was "well-nigh limitless"; only
congressional grace might protect the conscientious objector. On the
other hand, a competing tradition might be traced through the DavisClark brief in Macintosh and the dissenting opinion of Charles Evans
Hughes in the same case, the Thomas Reed Powell essay, and Judge
.Wyzanski's decision in United States v. Sisson. Lacking the authoritative
pronouncement of a Supreme Court majority opinion to give it binding force, it nevertheless stood as a strong restatement of principles
that might serve to limit governmental overreaching. Both traditions
could look back to the early history of the Republic for support. Conscription, although utilized during the Revolutionary War, wras viewed
with deep suspicion by the Founders. Protection of conscience, in the
form of legislative exemptions from military service, ias routine in the
revolutionary era, but it would be a mistake to read into these protections firm conclusions as to whether they were to be understood to be
a matter of legislative grace or constitutional right. The question
whether Congress might compel one who had conscientious scruples
to kill or to subject him to the alternative of summary punishment
remained open.

151 "The chief reason for reaching this conclusion after examining the competing
interests is the magnitude of Sisson's interest in not killing in the Vietnam conflict as
against the want of magnitude in the country's present need for him to be so employed."
152

Id. at 910.

I. at 911.
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III. "THE MORAL RIGHT CONSCIENTIOUSLY TO OBJECT TO A
PARTICULAR WAR IS INCONTESTABLE": THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DOCTRINE AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC OPINION

It is in the writings of St. Augustine, the great theologian of
fourth- and fifth-century North Africa, that one sees articulated the
concepts that would shape just-war thought for succeeding generations. 15 3 Augustine grounded his theory of justified warfare on humankind's sinfulness: Because of original sin, conflict and strife are
inevitable in the world. "[I] n an imperfect world the just man, no less
than the scoundrel, is faced with imperfect choices and with the harsh
realities that flow from them." 15 4 Augustine limited the waging of war
to legitimately constituted authority, which alone has power from God
to take life,155 and sought as well strictly to constrain the motives
under which the state might act. War should not be waged for reasons

of conquest or the desire to dominate (libido dominandi), but should
only be waged for defensive reasons and out of love for the other.Y06
Practically speaking, Augustine left little room for the individual conscientious objector, 157 although Louis Swift cautions that Augustine
did leave room for individual disobedience of unjust laws.'" 8
The lawyers and theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries worked these insights into a systematic doctrine known as just-war
153 David Lenihan makes the important point that Augustine himself did not propose a unified theory ofjust war-his admonitions on warfare occur in the context of
works on other subjects-and also cautions that Augustine's thought on warfare is
quite complex, but that this sense of complexity was lost as succeeding generations
mined Augustine for proof-texts supportive of their own arguments. See David A.
Lenihan, TheJust War Theory in the Work of SaintAugustine, in 19 AUGUSTINIAN STUD. 37
(1988).
154 Louis SWvFr, THE EARLY FATHERS ON WAR AND MIUTARY SERVICE 116 (1983).
155 Id. at 128-31. Augustine went so far as to teach that an individual confronted
with deadly force may not kill his attacker, since this amounted to preferring a temporal good-one's life-over virtuous conduct. Id.
156 See LouisJ. Swift, Search the Scriptures: PatristicExegesis and the lus Belli, in PEACE
IN A NucLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETrER IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at
48, 60-67. "[T]he use of force must be motivated by love and carried out for the
public good by those charged to do so." Id. at 64.
157 See SwwFr, supra note 154, at 139.

[A] righteous man, who happens to be serving under an ungodly sovereign,
can rightfully protect the public peace by engaging in combat at the latter's
command when he receives an order that is either not contrary to God's law
or is a matter of doubt (in which case it may be that the sinful command
involves the sovereign in guilt whereas the soldier's subordinate role makes
him innocent) ....
Id. (quoting AUGUSTINE, AGAINST FAUSTUS 22.75).
158 See id. at 140.
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theory. Gratian, the twelfth-century father of the systematic study of
canon law, 1 59 cited authorities that justified warfare to recover lost
goods, or to repel enemy attack, or to defend "[one]self, [one's] associates, the Church, the patria, or the commonwealth, " 160 and he followed these citations by generalizing that "a just war is waged by an
authoritative edict to avenge injuries. " 161 Gratian followed Augustine
in allowing little room for the conscientious objector, although some
of his late twelfth-century successors began to open the door slightly

in this direction. 162 Thirteenth-century commentators, especially
Pope Innocent IV, moved further in the direction of allowing room
for individual conscientious scruples by relying on the Roman law of
actions to discourage vassals from participating in their lords' unjust

wars.163 A vassal, Innocent argued, could maintain an actio mandati
against his lord to obtain compensation for losses suffered in a just
war, but he was without remedy should he participate in an unjust
conflict.'6 A vassal thus had economic incentive to scrutinize carefully the merits of his lord's cause. The fourteenth-century writer Giovanni da Legnano extended this teaching even further, proposing an
entire system of actions that revolved around the question whether
the participants fought in ajust or unjust conflict 65
U. L RE%,.
159 SeeJohn T. Noonan, Jr., Catholic Law Sdioo, A.D. 1150, 47 Cv.
1189 (1998) (considering Gratian's dialectical method);John T. Noonan,Jr., Gratian
Slept Her: The Changing Identity of the Father of the Systematic Study of Canon Law, 35
TRADrno 145 (1979).
160 FaRxmcK H. RUSSELL, THm JusT WAR IN THE MIDDLE ACES 62 (1975).
161 Id. at 64.
162 Writing about some of the principal late twelfth-century legal commentaries,
Frederick Russell has recorded:
The Summa: "InperatorieMaiestati" refused to allow Christians who had formerly fought for an infidel prince to be promoted to higher clerical orders.
A more generally applicable opinion w-as that of Simon of Bisignano, who
prohibited subjects from obeying the commands of heretical, schismatic, or
excommunicated lords. Huguccio more precisely forbade %ussalsof an excommunicated lord to perform those obligations stipulated in the feudal
contract, including joining the lord's army, going to war ith him, and defending him. This position was potentially of crucial importance for the extension of ecclesiastical doctrine and discipline. Yet the construction of a
theory of disobedience to orders that were defective as to authority or unjust
in cause still lay in the future.
Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
163 See id- at 150-53.
164 See id. at 151.
165 See GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, TRACrATUS DE BELLO, DE RFYREsU.ItS, Er DE DUELLo
(Thomas Erskine Holland ed., 1964); see alsoJames A. Brundage, The Limits of the Warmaking Power. The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists, in PEAcE IN A NucLRn Ac-
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A few of the medieval theologians also cautiously endorsed the
possibility of individual conscientious objection. Peter the Chanter,
like the lawyer Innocent IV, made reference to the feudal relations of
his day in proposing that knights and vassals were under no duty to
serve in their overlord's unjust wars. 16 6 Similarly, in oblique fashion,
Roland of Cremona (ca. 1230) proposed that an armed force that
doubted the justness of its cause was obliged to obey God rather than
man and to disobey its orders to fight. 16 7 Other theologians, however,
rejected these conclusions, and by the middle and later thirteenth
century Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas had moved the
terms of debate away from considerations of the justness of the cause
and back toward the Augustinian concern with competent authority. 168 Aquinas, however, by emphasizing that one had a general right
to disobey the unjust commands of rulers, at least indirectly allowed
169
for conscientious objection to unjust war.
It is in sixteenth-century Spain that these elements were woven
together into a consistent theory of conscientious objection. Francisco de Vitoria, working in the context of a Spanish state that was far
more unified and hierarchically structured than the feudal kingdoms
Innocent IV or Giovanni da Legnano dr Peter the Chanter wrote
about, grounded his theory of objection on the right to resist tyrannical rule. 7 0 In his treatise De Potestate Civili ("On the Civil Power"),
Vitoria maintained that the state was a natural institution and the outTHE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 69, 82-84 (further
examining Legnano's system for controlling welfare).
166 See RUSSELL, supra note 160, at 224-25. Russell explains Peter the Chanter's
teaching:

[T] he context [of his statement] suggests that Peter intended to champion a
vassal's right to refuse to serve in his lord's unjust war. Well aware of the
tendency of vassals to disobey their lords when it suited their own purposes,

Peter probably intended to build upon this practice to deprive princes of
manpower for their unjust wars.
Id.
167 See id. at 228.
168 See id. at 233-34.
169 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, q. 104, art. 5; see also LeRoy
Brandt Walters, Five Classic Just-War Theories: A Study in the Thought of Thomas
Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili, and Grotius 140 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the University of Notre Dame Hesburgh Library)
(further elaborating on Aquinas's recognition of a right to disobey unjust
commands).
170

See Paul Dewayne Simmons, Selective Conscientious Objection as an Ethical Ap-

proach to ChristianParticipationin Warfare 114-19 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary) (on file with the University of
Michigan).
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growth of societies of persons that organized themselves so that their
members might bear one another's burdens.17 ' Royal power, the
most natural form of governance, Vitoria continued, is derived ultimately from divine and natural law, not from the political community.'7 2 But while kingly power is the result of immutable law,
particular kings are made by the political community. 7 3 The earliest
kings were elected and, Vitoria observed, many rulers in his own daythe Pope, the kings of Venice and Florence-were still elected.' 74
Hence the power to choose one's king remained in some residual
175
sense in the people, since it is a part of the natural law.
Because the political community is responsible for choosing a
king, it is equally responsible when that ruler goes astray. 176 Vitoria
selected the example of unjust war to make his point: Should a king
wage unjust war against his neighbors, they may rightly prosecute war
against the unjust king and kill his subjects, "even if they are all innocent."' 7" Thus the state is obliged to entrust power only to those who
rule rightly and, by implication, to remove tyrants from power.'7 8 Furthermore, the ruler's legislation counts as binding law only insofar as
it is in conformity with the requirements of the natural and divine law
79
and actually serves the interest of the state.'
While the right of the individual to object conscientiously to war
is implicit in his analysis of state power, Vitoria made the point explicitly in his two treatises on war, De lure Beli and De Bello.1' Echoing
Gratian, Vitoria asserted that there was only one cause for just war. to
171 "Cum itaque humanae societates propter hunc finem constitutae sint, scilicet
ut alter alterius onera portaret .... " FRANCISCO DE VrroPtA, De Polestale Civili, in
R.LE=ONFs TEOLOcicAS 156 (Teofilo Urdanoz ed.,
OBRAS DE FRANcisCO DE VrromAR

1960). Vitoria continued, "Patet ergo fontem et originem civitatum rerumque publicarum non inventum esse hominum neque inter artificiata numerandum, sed tanquam a natura profectum quae ad mortalium tutelam et conserationem hanc
rationem mortalibus suggessit." Id. at 157.

172 Id. at 160-61.
173 I at 160.
174 d. at 180.
175 See id. ("Item, quia aliquando genus humanum habuit istam potestatem, scilicet eligendi monarcham. ....Ergo nunc potest. Gum enim ilia potestas esset iuris
naturalis, non cessaL").

176 See id. at 167 ("Quod tota respublica potest puniri licite pro peccato regis.").
177 Id. "Unde si rex iniustum bellum inferret alicui principi, potest ime qui iniuriam accept praedari et alia iure belli persequi, et occidere regis subditos, edam si
omnes sint innocentes." Id.

178 Id.

179 See id. at 183.
180 See Simmons, supra note 170, at 124-28.
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right a wrong. 181 Not every wrong, furthermore, can be the subject of
a just war: warfare entails slaughter, fire, and laying waste, and thus
the wrong being vindicated must be of comparable gravity. 182 No
other motivation for warfare-such as differences of religion, or ex183
pansion of empire, or princely glory-can make it just.

Vitoria considered and rejected the proposition that the prince's
18
belief in the justness of his cause was sufficient to make the war just. 4
After all, princes rarely wage war in subjective bad faith and routinely
believe they are acting justly.18 5 The consequence of relying on the

subjective judgment of the prince would be that all belligerents would
be innocent, even Turks or Saracens who chose to make war on Christians thinking they were thereby fulfilling their duty to God.18 6 It is
essential therefore, Vitoria continued, that the prince carefully scruti-

nize the propriety of the war and even give an audience to the views of
187

his adversaries.
Nor is the prince alone in this obligation. Vitoria followed this
analysis by asking whether subjects were similarly obliged to scrutinize
the justness of a war and by answering in the affirmative. 188 "If a subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, he is not permitted to fight,
even at the command of his prince," 189 Vitoria asserted. One who was
convinced the cause was wrong but still fought would be engaged in

181 Francisco de Vitoria, De lure Belli, in DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELLI RELECTIONES
269, 279 (Ernest Nys ed., 1917) ("Unica est et sola causa iusta inferenda bellum, iniuria accepta.").
182 "Cum ergo quae in bello geruntur, omnia sint gravia et atrocia, ut caedes, incendia, vastationes, non licet pro levibus iniuriis bello persequi auctores iniurianm,
quia iuxta mensuram delicti debet esse plagarum modus." Id.
183 Id. at 278.
184 "Et primum quidem dubium circa iustitiam belli, utrum ad bellum iustum sufficiat quod princeps credat se habere iustam causam. Ad hoc sit prima propositlo:
Non semper hoc saris est." Id. at 281.
185 "Communiter enim non contingit quod principes gerant bellum mala fide, sed
credentes se iustam causam sequi." Id.
186 "Et sic omnes bellantes essant innocentes, et per consequens non liceret interficere in bello. Item alias etiam Turcae et Saraceni gererent iusta bella adversus
Christianos: putant enim se obsequium praestare Deo." Id. at 281-82.
187 "Oportet ad bellum iustum magna diligentia examinare iustitiam et causas
belli et audire etiam rationes adversariorum, si velint ex aequo et bono disceptare."
Id. at 282.
188

Id.

189 "Si subdito constat de iniustitia belli, non licet militare, eiam ad imperlum
principis." Id.
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the killing of innocents, which is always wrong.19 0 Not even soldiers
are to be excused from killing in bad faith.1 9 '
Vitoria considered all advisors to a prince-ienators, petty nobility, and all those admitted to government council-to be obliged independently to scrutinize the justice of a war.192 Minores--members
of the lower orders who are not admitted to council-are not re-

quired to examine the justice of the cause, but may ordinarily rely
upon the judgment of public authority. 93 But even such lesser folk

are not altogether exonerated. The evidence of the injustice of a war
might be so overwhelming that ignorance would not excuse even
them. 94 Thus, the Roman soldiers who crucified Jesus should be
held responsible for following Pilate's command since, presumably,
they must have known they were doing wrong.195
Vitoria then proceeded to limit the reach of this right of conscientious objection. Only those who are in a state of certainty regarding
a war's injustice are to refrain from fighting. 196 Where a subject is in a
state of doubt concerning the war, he is obliged to follow his
prince. 97 To do otherwise would be to expose the state to the depredations of the enemy, which is a more serious wrong than fighting in a
state of doubt'19 8 In this way, Vitoria balanced the requirements of
the state with the obligations of conscience.
Vitoria reiterated these views in his De Bello, which is a commentary on Thomas Aquinas's treatment of just war.' 99 Subjects who are
aware of the injustice of a war are obliged to refrain from fighting,
even if their prince attempts to coerce them, since one must place
loyalty to God ahead of loyalty to the prince.2 00 Elites are further
190 "Haec patet, quia non licet interficere innocentem quacumque auctoritzte.
Sed hostes sunt innocentes in eo casu." Id.

191

"Ergo milites etiam mala fide pugnantes non excusantur." Id.

192
193

See id
Id. at 283.

194 "Nihilominus possent esse talia argumenta et indicia de iniustitia belli quod
ignorantia non excusaret etiam huiusmodi subditos militantes." Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 285.
197 Id.
198 "Sed, si subditi in casu dubii non sequantur principem suum in bellum, exponunt se periculo prodendi hostibus Rempublicam, quod multo graius est quam
pugnare contra hostes cum dubio." Id.
199 This treatise is found in Vitoria's commentary on ie Summa Thacloiae of

Thomas Aquinas. See 2 FRANcisco

DE VrromxA, CommNTuoS A LA SECUNDA SECUNDA

SANTO To s q. 40, at 279-93 (Vicente Beltr-an de Heredia ed., 1932).
200 "[S]i constat bellum esse injustum vel si scitur ve isti habent conscientiam quod

DE

est injustum, non possunt bellare, etianisi cogantur a principe. Ratio est quia ille
peccat mortaliter, et obediendum est Deo potius quarn ii." Id. at 282.
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obliged to inform themselves independently of the justice of the war
and to advise the prince of the impropriety of his proposed course of1
20
conduct, although commoners are not under such an obligation.
Where there is doubt as to the justice of a war, soldiers may freely
participate in combat, but willful ignorance of injustice does not excuse even common footsoldiers.20 2 Indeed, even common soldiers
who are enriched by participation in a war they know to be unjust are
2 03
obliged to make restitution.
Alphonsus de Ligouri (1696-1787), the great eighteenth-century
lawyer and moralist, founder of the Redemptorist Order, and standard reference for moralists of the next century and a half, reiterated
Vitoria's claims. Placing his treatment of just war under the Fifth
Commandment's prohibition against killing,20 4 Ligouri argued that if
the subject of a prince is summoned to war, he may fight so long as his
conscience is in a state of doubt.2 0 5 But where a soldier understands a
war to be unjust, he may not receive absolution for his sin unless he
seeks, as quickly as possible, his dismissal from the military and in the
206
interim refrains from hostile acts.
The theological principle of selective conscientious objection was
further refined in 1961, on the eve of the American involvement in
Vietnam, by Paul Ramsey.20 7 Writing in the context of the reformed
Protestant tradition, Ramsey acknowledged that historically the competence to determine the justice of a war had belonged to the leaders
of states, but that the situation had changed with the advent of modSecundo dico, quod plebei, qui non admittuntur ad consilium principis, non
tenentur scire causam bellijustam, sed possunt sequi regem. Patet hoc, quia non
omnes possunt informari de causa belli. Tertio dico, quod magnates qui ad consilium pincipis admittuntur, illi tenentur inquirere de causa belli, ad eos enim
exspectat hoc.

201

Id.
202 Verum est quod, ut diximus in materia de ignorantia, si illa est crassa et quasi

ignorantia volita, non excusat. Ita dico quod si sunt apparentiae quod bellum
non estjustum: ego dubito, sed quia habeo affectionem ad regem mieum, claudo
oculos; quid ego scio? dico quod tunc non excusarer a peccato. Quando ergo
dicimus quod ubi est dubium possunt sequi bellum subditi, intelligitur quando
dubium est probabile.

Id. at 282-83.
203 Id. at 283.
204 See S. ALPHONSI DE LiGOURI, 2 THEOLOCIA MoRAus 258-65 (Paris, Apud.
Ludovicum Vives 1878).

205 Id. at 260.
206 Id. at 261 ("Miles intelligens bellurn esse injustum, in quo est, non potest absolvi, nisi velit, qurn primtm potest, curare dimissionem, et intere-t abstinere ab actibus hostilitatis.").

207

See

PAUL RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE:

WAR BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? (1961).

How SHALL

MODERN
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em democracies.2 0 8 Christian citizens, with the responsibility of electing the leaders of states, were now equally responsible with their
leaders for seeing to it that warfare remained just and limited with
respect to both ends and means. 20 9 And if individual Christians had
the responsibility ofjudging the justice of their leaders' actions, Ramsey concluded, they must also be accorded the right of selectively objecting to wars they determine to be unjust- 10
In the same year Ramsey published his book, American military
advisers began to arrive in Vietnam in significant, though still limited,
numbers.2 1 ' After serving in a subsidiary capacity for several years,
Americans became more directly involved in fighting following the

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964 and the escalation of combat operations by President LyndonJohnson in the spring of 1965.212
By the late spring of 1965, one could find organized opposition to the
war, particularly on American university campuses.2 13 The beginning

of religious opposition to the war is dateable to the same period of
2 14
time.
In 1964, the Jesuit periodical America could editorialize against
those who claim "the right to prefer his opinion to the judgment of
the law regarding compulsory military service. No government, we

think, could take a different attitude and allow everyone who says, 'I
am against war,' to escape the draft."2 15 By 1965, however, selective
208
209

Id.
210

See id. at 126-27.
See id. at 127-28.
In an age when war is apt to be total, and therefore, unjust, will it be sufficient to limit war for the churc4 to address its teaching to the leaders of
nations; or must not... this discipline be addressed and inculcated so far as
the church finds possible in the people generally?
See id.at 128-29.
[I]t does not seem possible re.ponsibly to call for a general discipline to limit
the use of force unless the church at the same time makes the decision to
support its members who refuse to fight because they believe a particular
war to be unjust .... This would mean that the church will consciously
attempt to obtain in military draft laws some status for those who refuse to
fight unjustly as wel as for those who have conscientious objection to all war.

Id.

See STANLEY KARNoW, VLEriAm: A HISTORY 272 (2d rev. ed. 1997).
212 See id. at 380-94, 411-41.
213 See Toms WELLS, TiHa WAR Wrrm: AsEwrsc-'s BATrLE OvER VwrInwt 23-65
(1994).
214 See MrrcHEuL K. HALL,BECAUSE OF THEIR EuTH: CALCAW ,%NDREIGIous OP.
POSITION TO THE VITNAM NVW 9-10 (1990); Walter S. Griggs,Jr., The Sleike Consdentious Objector A Vietnam Legay 21 J.CHURCH & ST. 91, 95-100 (1979).
215 Freedom of Consience, 110 AMmamcA 759, 759 (1964).
211
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conscientious objection had begun to emerge as an issue in Christian
debate on Vietnam. In an editorial in Christianity and Crisis, Roger
21
Shinn raised the question of selective conscientious objection. 6
Shinn acknowledged the difficulties involved in granting selective conscientious objector status, but then pointed to the basic dilemma:
"[T]he person cannot surrender his conscience to the state. The
Christian in particular will always remember the apostolic protest, 'We
must obey God rather than men.' And all who believe in the dignity
of the person must be reluctant to compel anyone to act against deep
conviction." 21 7 In a sermon preached a week later, but published the
following April, Shinn elaborated on these themes. 2 18 He conceded

that restricting conscientious objector status to strict pacifists superficially made sense, 219 but he recognized that there were some whose
objection to the war in Vietnam might with equal conscientiousness
be grounded on other moral principles.2 20 Rhetorically, Shinn asked,
"Is not the recognition of conscience the difference between a demo22
cratic and a totalitarian government?" '
The next month, in an article published in the Christian Century,
John Swomley took note of some eighty men who had recently
claimed selective conscientious objector status and called upon the
churches to defend their rights. 2 22 "The issue of conscientious objection is crucial," Swomley asserted. "[T]he church dare not wait to
make up its mind until the war is over or until the just-war' objectors
22 3
are in prison."

Advocacy of selective conscientious objection quickened in intensity in 1966. Writing in the Christian Century in February 1966, Alan
Geyer, the director of international relations of the United Church of
Christ, invoked the just-war theory tojustify selective conscientious ob216 SeeRoger L. Shinn, How Free Can a FreeSociety Be?, 25 CHmiSTIANyT & Coisis 224
(1965).
217 Id. at 224.
218 See Roger L. Shinn, In a Time of Tragic Conflict, 32 Soc. AcnoN 19 (1966).
219 See id. at 23. "The basic meaning of the draft is a subjection of the individual
judgments to a socialjudgment. To give individuals freedom to pick and choose their
wars might subject the principle of universal obligation to unlimited personal caprice." Id.
220 Id. at 23-24.
221 Id. at 24.
222 See John M. Swomley, Jr., The "Limited" Objectors, 82 CHuiSriAN, CEN-fw,1
1541-42 (1965). "Now the churches must squarely face up to the fact that there are
in our midst conscientious men who object to the war in Vietnam because they believe it is not a just war." Id.
223 Id.
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jection. 224 "Just,war theory," Geyer asserted, "generates its own implicit demand for conscientious objection to somne wars which may be
waged by a democratic state." 2 25 After reviewing the criteria by which
a given war is judged to be moral or immoral, Geyer concluded by
proposing additional criteria by which the individual objector might

2 26
demonstrate the basis of his objections.
Writing in April 1966,John Pemberton, Executive Director of the
A.C.L.U., asserted that the distinction drawn by the draft laws between
protected pacifism and unprotected just-war objection was untenable.2 27 The selective objector, Pemberton observed, merely requests
the same treatment historically accorded pacifists and should not, on
that account, be discriminated against. 2 28 Furthermore, a draft registrant acting in bad faith to obtain a deferment, Pemberton added,
"would be the last person to identify himself as an objector to this
22 9
particular war, rather than as a pacifist."

In October 1966, the American Lutheran Church issued a statement on the Vietnam War that raised the issue of conscientious objection.2 0 Acknowledging that historically the Lutheran Church has

taught that "a Christian, as a citizen willingly should assume the duties
of citizenship, including the bearing of arms and engaging in just
SeeAlan Geyer, TheJust Warand Mhe Seedive Objertor,83 CHsri

224

CE-rumvn 199

(1966).
225
226

Id.
See id. at 201.
1. The selective objector should present evidence of his careful study
of the issues at stake in the particular conflict in which he refuses to
participate....
2. The selective objector should demonstrate that he is capable of a

serious effort at moral reasoning in the attempt to relate his convictions to
the data he possesses....

3. The selective objector should be called upon to demonstrate that
he has sought to give his convictions political expression....
4. The selective objector should indicate his wllingness to serve in
some military capacity other than engagement in the particular conflict to
which he objects....
5. The selective objector should indicate his willingness to accept
whatever legal penalties his position may impose upon him.
Id.

227 SeeJohn deJ. Pemberton,Jr., Selective Consdentious Objedion, 32 Soc. Acno.N 4.
10 (1966).
228 See id. at 6-9.
229 Id. at 9.
230 WORDS OF CONSCIENCE: REIGIOus STATEMENTS ON CONScIENTIOUS OBJEcTION
44 (Richard Malishchak ed., 8th ed. 1973) [hereinafter WoRDs OF CONSCIENCE]
(quoting THE AFmcA LUTHERAN CHURCH, WAR, PEACE, AND FturEo..t (1966)).
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war,"' 2 3 ' the statement went on to recognize that individuals "following the dictates of... conscience" may conclude that "they cannot
with good conscience bear arms."2 3 2 The Church promised support

to such objectors and "respectfully ask[ed] [the federal government]
that the pertinent provisions for alternative service be applied to those
of its members whose conscience impels them to refuse the bearing of
arms and commends to its members who are conscientious objectors
those alternatives for fulfilling the responsibility of citizenship."2 3 3
In a series of lectures published in February 1966, John C. Bennett, the President of Union Theological Seminary, observed that the
Second Vatican Council had called for the protection of those who
"object to particular wars" and predicted that Catholics "who conscientiously oppose particular wars" would become "quite a new factor"
in opposing the war in Vietnam.234
Official Catholic teaching on the relationship of the individual
conscience and just war, in the years between World War II and Viet-

nam, had undergone substantial development. The revised Baltimore
Catechism of 1949, following Alphonus de Ligouri's arrangement,
treated just war under the Fifth Commandment-"Thou Shalt Not

Kill." 23 5 Killing in war, the Catechism asserted, is permissible only

where the conflict satisfies the criteria of ajust war-it must be "necessary to defend the rights of the state in a grave matter;" 2 36 it must be
"undertaken only as a last resort after all other means have failed;"2 37
and it must be "conducted in accordance with natural and international law."' 238 Only then may "[t]he life of another person ... law'23 9
fully be taken.
In his Christmas Message of 1956, Pope Pius XII, with the Soviet
Union's crushing of the Hungarian uprising fresh in his mind,2 40
sought to contextualizejust-war theory to fit the demands of the Cold
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 JOHN COLEMAN BENNETr, FOREIGN POLICY IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTI1VE 109-10 n.9
(1966).
235 See A CATECHISM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 204-06 (Cofraternity of Christian
Doctrine ed., rev. ed. 1949).
236 Id. at 205.
237 Id.
238 Id. The Catechism added that an otherwise just war ceases to be just where It is
"continued after due satisfaction has been offered or given by the unjust aggressor
nation." Id. at 206.
239 Id. at 205.
240 See Pope Pius XII, An Appeal for Peace radio address (Nov. 10, 1956), in 3 TIIE
PoPE SPEAxs 355, 355-56 (1957).
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War and to respond to the issue of the dissenting conscience. 4 1 The
West, Pius observed, stands "in the face of an enemy determined to
impose on all peoples, in one way or another, a special and intolerable way of life .... [M] ethods which rely on tanks [that] noisily crash
over borders,"24 2 and "the threat of using atomic weapons" 2 43 create
"conditions, which have no counterpart in the past."2 44 In these circumstances, Pius asserted, it is lawful for a nation to go to war, "for
effective self-defense and with the hope of a favorable outcome."2 4:
Where the state is democratically constituted and confronted with "a
moment of extreme danger," Pius continued, it would not be proper
for "a Catholic citizen... [to] invoke his own conscience in order to
2 46
refuse to serve and fulfill those duties the law imposes."
The Second Vatican Council, however, proposed a reformulation
ofjust-wvar thought that was sensitive to a different aspect of the Cold
War, the consequences of nuclear conflagration. In Gaudiun el Spes,
the PastoralConstitutionon the Church in the Modem lVorld, the Council
asserted that the invention of weapons of mass destruction now threatens "total warfare," the result of which "would be the almost complete
reciprocal slaughter of one side by the other."2 47 Because of the
threat of global destruction, the Council felt itself compelled "to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of wvar," 2 48 condemning as "a
crime against God" "[elvery act of war directed to the indiscriminate
destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants." 2 9 The
Council reminded Christians that the natural law continued to govern
the waging of war and admonished those in positions of responsibility
that "blind obedience [to orders] cannot excuse those who carry them
out." 250 The Council then proposed that "it seems just that laws
241

See Pope Pius XII, The Contradiction of Our Age, in 3 THE POPE SPEM-s, supra

note 240, at 331 342-45.
242 Id. at 342-43.
243 Id. at 343.
244 I&

245 Id.
246 Id. It must be noted that Pope Pius XII retained as presuppositions of his
analysis traditional just-war criteria, that is self-defense and hope of a favorable outcome. Where these criteria were not satisfied, the traditional teaching on conscien-

tious objection presumably remained effective.
247 Gaudium et Spes, supra note 61, 18, reprintedin VAc'zn,
cauAR AND

POST

CONCILIAR

Docu trsr-,

CouNCIL

If-THE CO.-

supra note 61, at 903, 989.

248 Id.
249

Id. at 990.

250 Id. at 988. The Council continued, "[W]e cannot commend too highly the
courage of the men who openly and fearlessly resist those who issue orders of this
kind." Id.
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should make humane provision for the case of conscientious objectors
who refuse to carry arms, provided they accept some other form of
25 1
community service."
Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI also added to the changing
Catholic attitude toward war. Fearful of uncontrolled nuclear exchange, John XXIII wrote in Pacem in Terris, "For this reason it is
hardly possible to imagine that in the atomic era war could be used as
an instrument ofjustice."25 2 Negotiation, John proposed, should become the means of settling disputes and a means by which "men may
come to discover better the bonds that unite them together."2 3 Two
years later, addressing the United Nations in October 1965, Pope Paul
VI pronounced, "never again one against the other, never, never
again!"254 Paul VI went on to outline a program for "building peace,"

which included disarmament, economic justice toward developing na-

tions, and respect for human rights. 255
Neither Council nor popes abandoned the just-war theory. Indeed, the Second Vatican Council continued to endorse the possibility of "the right of lawful self-defense." 256 But one can also locate in
these texts a shift in the emphasis of doctrine: while war might still be
recognized as an instrument of justice, its indiscriminate character,
given the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, meant that the
decision to go to war must truly be one of last resort. A set of teachings was put in place that could offer substantial comfort to those who
dissented from the decision to wage war.
Official Catholic documents in the mid-1960s addressing speciflcally the Vietnam War, however, moved only tentatively toward a critical position. In an address to the College of Cardinals in June 1966,
Pope Paul VI criticized the "sad spectacle" of war in Vietnam and
called on the parties to "achieve a solution through frank and honorable negotiations." 2 57 In October, in the encyclical ChristiMatri, Paul
VI returned to the theme of Vietnam, expressing his concern that "the
danger of a more serious and extensive calamity hangs over the
251
252

Id.

His HOLINESS POPE
XXIII 42-43 (William J. Gibbons ed., 1963).
253 Id. at 43.
254 Pope Paul VI, The Pope's Appeal for Peace, Address to the United Nations
POPEJOHN XXIII, PAcEM IN TERRS: ENCYCLICAL LErER OF

JOHN

General Assembly (Oct. 4, 1965), in 11 THE POPE SPEAxs 47, 51, 54 (1966).
255 See id. at 54-57.
256 VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note 247, at 989.

257 Pope Paul VI, A Review of World Trouble Spots, Address to the College of
Cardinals (June 24, 1966), in 11 THE POPE SPEAKS, supra note 254, at 236, 238.
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human family and has increased, especially in eastern Asia where a
bloody and hard-fought war is raging."- s
In June 1966 Lawrence Cardinal Shehan, archbishop of the
founding American see of Baltimore, issued a pastoral letter, Peaceand
Patriotism, intended to "recall[] some of the pertinent principles formulated by the Vatican Council concerning modern 'arfare."- 9 Shehan stressed the Vatican Council's recognition of patriotism as a
virtue of citizenship, but also reminded his readers that citizenship
entailed the duty to examine the moral choices made by government. 2 60 Supporters as well as opponents of the Vietnam War were
equally bound by this obligation. 26 1 Shehan also made it clear that
accommodation must be made for the conscientious objector.
"[S]ince modern warfare bears within it the seeds of global holocaust,
the viewpoint of the sincere conscientious objector merits careful
262
consideration."
In mid-November 1966, the Catholic Bishops' Conference issued
a statement entitled Peace and Vietnam.2 63 Recognizing that nations
have the right to defend themselves and further acknowledging that
"what a nation can do to defend itself, it may do to help another in its
struggle against aggression," 2 64 the bishops judged that "it is reasonable to argue that our presence in Vietnam isjustified."2 65 The bishops
went on, however, to stress that "[w]hile we can conscientiously support the position of our country in the present circumstances, it is the
duty of everyone to search for other alternatives."2 6 The bishops
stressed as well that "[n]o one is free to evade his personal responsibility by leaving it entirely to others to make moral judgments "2 6 7 and
that "some provision should be made for those who conscientiously
268
object to bearing arms."
258 Pope Paul VI, ChristiMatti (Sept. 15, 1966), in 11 THE POPE SPEums, supranote
254, at 221, 221.
259 Lawrence Cardinal'Shehan, Letter on Peace and Patriotiwn (June 28, 1966), reprinted as PatrioticDuties ... in the Present Hour, ATH. RE,., July 1, 1966, at 1.
260 Id.
261 See id.

262 Id. at 2.
263 Peace and Vietnam, Statement Issued by the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops (Nov. 18, 1966), reprinted in 3 PASoRAL LErrERs OF THE UNrrED STATrs Q,%TH.
ouc BISHoPs, supra note 9, at 74.
264 Id. at 75.
265 Id. at 76.
266

Id.

267 Id. at 74.
268 Id. at 75.
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In 1966, there also appeared a pamphlet issued by the Catholic
Peace Fellowship, with the imprimatur of the Archdiocese of New
York. 2 69 Written by James Forest, the pamphlet called attention to the
pacifist witness of much of the early Church and also took note of
modem Christian martyrs, like FranzJdgerstatter, an Austrian who was
beheaded by the Nazis for his refusal to take part, even in a noncombatant role, in a war he considered unjust. 270 Forest recognized the
primary role conscience must play in the Christian's decision whether
to take up arms2 71 and also included a section entitled "The Un-just
War C.O.," which recited the major arguments in favor of this option.272 Forest illustrated the importance of individual moral judgment by reference to the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal27 3 and to
Adolph Eichmann's subsequent failed defense that he was only follow274
ing orders in carrying out the Holocaust.
On November 30, 1966, as if to put an end to further discussion
of the subject, a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, sponsored by Freedom House and signed by numerous public figuresDwight Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, Thurman Arnold, Jacob Javits,
and others of similar stature-announced in a banner headline that
"Extremists Could Delay Vietnam Negotiations." 275 The text of the
advertisement condemned five "fantasies," including the proposition

that "military service in this country's armed forces is an option exercisable solely at the discretion of the individual. '2 76 "No nation anywhere, now or in the past," the advertisement continued, "has ever
recognized that principle. Those who urge individual defiance on
moral grounds merely betray the genuine tenets of conscientious ob'2 77
jection which our people respect.
269

SeeJAMEs H. FOREST, CATHOLICS AM CONSCIENTIOUS

270
271

Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 5.

OBJECTION

1 (1966).

272 Id. at 8-9.
273 The Nuremberg Tribunal rejected as a defense the claim that the defendant
was only following orders. "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment." Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal, Oct.
6, 1945, U.S.-Fr.-U.K.-U.S.S.R., art. 8, reprinted in I OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 4, 6 (1946).
274

See FORES,

supra note 269, at 8.

275 Leaders Warn thatExtremists CouldDelay Vietnam Negotiations, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 30,
1966, at L37 (paid advertisement).
276 Id.
277 Id.
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This advertisement was followed in February 1967 by the Report
of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service.2 78 Chaired
by Burke Marshall, vice-president and general counsel of IBM, the
Commission comprised leaders from industry, labor, civil rights, the

media, and the academy 2 7 9 and achieved fame for its recommenda280
tion that selective service be accomplished through a draft lottery.
A majority of the Commission rejected the possibility of selective conscientious objection for a series of five reasons that mingled prudential and administrative concerns and betrayed a basic lack of

understanding of arguments on behalf of selective objection.28 At
the heart of the majority's rejection of selective objection was the belief that total pacifism was a "moral" judgment, while selective objec-

tion was "political." 28 2 The Commission's majority failed to appreciate
that at the heart of the Catholic analysis of just war was the moral
278
SERVEs

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM1'N ON SELEcTIrE SERV., IN PvRSUIT OF
WHAEN NOT ALL SERVE? (1967).

EQurnY

WHO

279 See id. at v.
280 See id. at 37-40.
281 See id. at 50-51.
[T]he majority believes that the status of conscientious objection can properly be applied only to those who are opposed to all killing of human beings
under any circumstances. It is one thing to deal in law with a person who
believes he is responding to a moral imperative outside of himself when he
opposes all killing. It is another to accord a special status to a person who
believes there is a moral imperative which tells him he can kill under some
circumstances ahd not kill under others. Moreover, the question of 'classical Christian doctrine" on the subject ofjust and unjust uars is one which
would be interpreted in different wa)s by different Christian denominations
and therefore not a matter upon which tie Commission could pass
judgment.
Secondly, the majority holds that so-called selective pacifism is essentially a political question of support or nonsupport of a war and cannot be
judged in terms of special moral imperatives....
Third, in the majority view, legal recognition of selective pacifism could
open the doors to a general theory of selective disobedience to law, which
could quickly tear down the fabric of government; the distinction is dim
between a person conscientiously opposed to participation in a particular
war and one conscientiously opposed to payment of a particular tax.
Fourth, the majority of the Commission was unable to see the morality
of a proposition which would permit the selective pacifist to avoid combat
service by performing noncombatant senice in support of a war which he
had theoretically concluded to be unjust.
Finally, the majority felt that a legal recognition of selective pacifism
could be disruptive to the morale and effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
Id.

282

See id. at 50.
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requirement to judge, according to well-established criteria, the justice of a particular course of conduct.
Far from ending debate, these two documents prompted an outpouring of criticism. In a symposium in Worldview, Staughton Lynd
challenged the veracity of the Freedom House claim that selective objection lacked historical grounding, 283 while Paul Ramsey, who had
been among the signatories of the Freedom House document, sought
to reconcile his stance in 1966 with his stance in 1961.284 The human
person, Ramsey argued, is obliged to work for the common good,
which may entail military service, but the person is not wholly absorbed by the state. 28 5 The state's decision to go to war should be
taken as presumptively moral, but a certain freedom must nevertheless be accorded mature and informed conscientious judgment 8 0
Thus, Ramsey concluded, while the draft ought to be continued, the
laws should also take account of the morally responsible selective
28 7
objector.
John Courtney Murray, defender of religious liberty,28 8 advocate
on behalf of the compatibility of Catholicism and the American constitutional experiment, 28 9 proponent of the just-war theory,290 and dissenting member of the Marshall Commission, also publicly raised his
voice on behalf of selective conscientious objection. Speaking at commencement at Western Maryland University inJune 1967, two months
before his death, Murray implicitly refuted those who would separate
politics and morality:
The essential significance of the traditional Uust-war] doctrine is
that it insists, first, that military decisions are a species of political
decisions, and second, that political decisions must be viewed, not
See Staughton Lynd, Notes on a Tradition, 10 WORLDViEW, Feb. 1967, at 4, 4.
284 See Paul Ramsey, DiscretionaryArmed Service, 10 WoRmviEw, Feb. 1967, at 8; see
also Paul Ramsey, Selective Conscientious Objection: Warrants and Reservations, in A CoN.

283

FLIGT OF LOYALTIEs: THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

31 (James

Finn ed., 1968) (expanding earlier arguments on behalf of legal recognition of selective objection).

285
286
287
288
289

Ramsey, DiscretionaryArmed Service, supra note 284, at 8.
See id. at 9-11.
Id. at 8, 11.
See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 340-48.
SeeJOHN COURTNEY MuRRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRuTHs: CATHOLIc REFLECTIONS
(1960); see also GEORGE WEIGEL, TRANQUILLITAs

ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION
ORDINIs: THE PRESENT

FAILURE AND

THOUGHT ON WAR AND PEACE

FurTuRE PROMISE

OF AMERICAN

CATHOLIC

112-22 (1987).

290 See generallyJOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, MORALrn AND MODERN WARFARE (1959);
see also WEIGEL, supra note 289, at 126-30.
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simply in the perspective of politics as an exercise of power, but of
morality and theology in some -Alid sense.- 9 1
Indeed, Murray continued, just-war thought itself is grounded on

the moral insight that "the order ofjustice and law cannot be left without adequate means for its own defense, including the use of
force."2 92 Any use of force by the state, however, must satisfy tradi-

tional moral criteria. 293 The application of these criteria requires the
"consideration of certain political and military factors," but does not

thereby "make the judgment purely political. It is ajudgment reached
within a moral universe, and the final reason for it is of the moral
29 4
order."

Murray chose not to debate the merits of selective objection, finding that " [ s] trictly on grounds of moral argument, the right conscien-

tiously

to

object

to

participation

in

a

particular

war

is

incontestable." 295

He admonished his listeners that one had to separate the case for selective objection from the war in Vietnam: Murray
himself could maintain the justice of the Vietnam War while at the
same time advocating that selective objection be recognized legally. 3
Finally, Murray asserted that the burden of proof of any person assert-

ing selective objector status rested with the individual and that the
objector must be prepared to accept the consequences of his consci2
entiously-made decision.

97

The major religious periodicals quickly followed the lead of the

theologians in editorializing in favor of selective conscientious objection. Christianityand Crisisproposed that "it is now time for our draft
procedures to recognize the rights of conscientious objectors who, although they are not pacifists, nevertheless have moral objections to

291 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, SELEcIE CONSCiENmTOUS OBIECrIoN 6-7 (1967), reprinted asJohn Courtney Murray, War and Consdence, in A CoxFacr OF Lo,uxIEs:
THE CASE FOR SELECTrVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, supra note 284, at 19, 19-30.
292 Id., reprinted in A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIEs: THE CSE FOR SELECTIE CONSCIENTbous OBJECnON, supra note 284, at 29.

293
294

I&
I&
295 Id., reprinted in A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: THE CGsE FOR SELECIVE CONSCIEN.
-nous OBj CTION, supra note 284, at 25.
296 Id., reprinted in A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: THE CASE FOR SELECTIE CONSCEXTIous OBjECrrON, supra note 284, at 22-23.
297 Id., reprinted in A CONFlICT OF LoYAL ES: THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, supra note 284, at 27 ("Mhen [the objector's] personal conscience
dashes with the conscience of the laws, his personal decision is his alone. It is %alid
for him, and he must follow it. But in doing so he still stands within the community
and is subject to its judgment as already declared.").

NOTRE

DAME LAW

fighting in some particular war." 298

[VOL- 76:3

REVIEW

Commonweal, for its part, re-

sponded to the Freedom House advertisement by criticizing its historiography-conscription was a recent phenomenon and even nations
engaged in modem warfare sometimes respected selective objection 29 9-and answered the Marshall Commission's distinction between morality and politics by observing that "[I]oral decisions ...
overlap with political ones."30 0 America called for a reform of the draft
laws declaring, "We believe that the young man who feels he cannot in
conscience kill those whom his government has designated 'enemies'
in Vietnam should not be required to kill."30 1
Christian churches, in their official documents, also endorsed selective objection. The United Church of Christ recognized that selective objection on the basis ofjust-war theory "is a valid expression of a
Christian's responsibility to make his daily decisions in the love of God
and in obedience to his living Word." 30 2 The General Convention of
the Episcopal Church declared itself in favor of selective objection in
September 1967, an endorsement that was followed by the Episcopal
House of Bishops in October 1968.303 The General Assembly of the

United Presbyterian Church declared in 1969 that "individuals who

object to particular wars which they judge to be unjust or unconscionable [are] entitled to appeal to the teaching of the church as the foundation of their moral stand. '304 The World Council of Churches
called upon its members to "give spiritual care and support" to those

3 05
who "object to participation in particular wars."

In November 1968 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
joined this list when it included a section in its pastoral letter, Human
Life in Our Day, that addressed "The Role of Conscience." ' 30 6 Taking
account of the Second Vatican Council's endorsement of conscientious objection and declaring that "the time has come" to modify the
298 Reappraisingthe Draft, 27 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 73, 73-74 (1967).
299 See The Draft and Conscience, 86 COMMONWEAL 139, 139-40 (1967).
300 Id. at 140.
301 The Selective Conscientious Objector, 117 AMERICA 73, 73 (1967).
302 WORDS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 230, at 74, 76 (quoting UNITED
CHRIST, STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE UNITED

CHURCH OF

CHURCH OF CHRIST

(1967)).
303 Id. at 28-29 (quoting HOUSE OF BISHOPS, EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SELECTIVE CON.
SCIENIOUS OBJECTION (1968)).
304 Id. at 62 (quoting THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, STATEMENT OF THE 181ST
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON WAR, PEACE, AND CONSCIENCE (1969)).
305 Id. at 80 (quoting WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, TOWARD JUSTICE AND PEACE
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
21 (1968)).
306 See 3 PASTORAL LETrERs OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supranote 9,
at 192-94.
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draft laws to recognize selective conscientious objection, the bishops
went on to urge that "we continue to hope that, in the all-important
3 0 7 Artiissue of war and peace, all men will follow their consciences."
des in the American EcclesiasticalReview 308 and The Priest30 9 helped to
disseminate this teaching to the clergy.
The agitation in Christian circles soon replicated itself in public
policy and legal debates. Carl Cohen, in the Nation, argued that the
selective service statute's protection of the pacifist but not thejust-war
objector was "gravely unjust. It discriminates among citizens, regarding their qualification for an established legal protection, on the basis
of the content of their moral principles."3 10 Declaring its support for
Judge Wyzanski's decision in United States v. Sisson,31 1 the New Republic
asserted "that democratic governments cannot long carry on imrs that
violate the conscience of large numbers of its citizens."3 1 2 In the summer of 1969, in an essay declaring that henceforth only volunteers

should be used for combat operations, William F. Buckley, the conservative commentator, wrote, "[I]t is uniquely the command to kill,
rather than the risk of being killed, that galls the refractory conscience."3 13 Against this rising chorus of voices, then-sitting Justice
Abe Fortas reiterated the arguments of the Marshall Commission:
"From the state's viewpoint, a disagreement about the morality of a
particular war is a difference ofjudgment or policy; it is not and314cannot be accepted as stemming from a moral or religious belief."
Legal literature, for the most part, advocated in favor of selective
objection. Ralph Potter, Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard Divinity
School, -relying in part on foreign precedents, such as the British use
of "conscientiousness" rather than strict pacifism as the touchstone in
conscientious objector cases, 31 5 argued on behalf of congressional action to confer recognition on selective objection. 3 0 Michael Tigar,
for his part, argued that the Free Exercise Clause required constitu307 Id. at 193.
308 SeeJohn F. Harvey, Selective ConscientiousObjection, 159 Am.Ecc.rstLsrc,%u RE%.
418 (1968).
309 See Edward V. Stevens, The Conscientious Objector His Care and Counse4 24 THE
PRIEST 298 (1968).
310 Carl Cohen, A Man May Choose: The Casefor Selective Padfsn, 207 THE NAION
11, 12 (1968).
311 299 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
312 Conscientious Objection, NEw REPuBuc, May 3, 1969, at 9.
313 Iflliam F. Buckley, Volunteers for Combat, 21 NAT'L REv. 714, 715 (1969).
314 ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING Dxsswr AND CIVIL DIsomENCE 88 (1968).
in 4 REuGIO ,AND
315 See Ralph Potter, Conscientious Objection to Particular mars,
THE Puauc ORDER 44, 54-56 (Donald A. Giannella ed., 1968).
316 See id. at 98-99.
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tional recognition of both total and selective objectors.' 1 7 A Comment in the University of Chicago Law Review argued in favor of
extending congressional protection to non-religious pacifists but not
to selective objectors,3 18 while a lead article in the Virginia Law Review
cautiously defended the free-exercise rights of selective objectors and
called on the Court to take a case to resolve this important outstanding question.3 1 9 An article in the Catholic Lawyer made the case that
the judiciary's protection of Jehovah's Witnesses but not Catholics
3 20
amounted to invidious religious discrimination.
Robert Drinan, however, the future congressman, then a professor at Boston College Law School, pushed the arguments the farthest.3 2 '

Recent

ecclesiastical

teaching, particularly Pope John

XXIII's Pacem in Terris,3 2 2 called into question the continued vitality of
just-war thought.3 23 The American intervention in Vietnam, Drinan
continued, had "fail[ed] to observe the rules of war. '3 24 From this

starting point, Drinan moved to the conclusion that pacifism, understood as "a policy of passive resistance or militant nonviolence toward
[aggression],"325 was the practice observed by the early Church and
the only reasonable alternative available to Christians in the modern
world. 326 Drinan's radicalism would have obviated the need for selective objection by moving the American Catholic Church away from
3 27
just-war thought and toward a pacifist witness.

317 See Michael E. Tigar, The Rights of Selective Service Registrants, inTHE RIGHT S OF
AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARIE-WHAT THEY SHouLD BE 499, 512-13 (Norman Dorsen
ed., 1970)..
318 See Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There butfor the
Grace of God .... 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 79 (1966).
319 See Hugh C. Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative
Grace, 54 VA. L. REv. 1355, 1394 (1968).
320 See Gaillard T. Hunt, Selective Conscientious Objection, 15 CATr-. LNw. 221, 231-37
(1969).
321 See ROBERT F. DRINAN, VIETNAM AND ARMAGEDDON: PEACE, WAR AND THE CiRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (1970).
322 See Pope John XXIII, supra note 252.
323 See DRINAN, supra note 321, at 38-39.
324 Id. at 135.
325 Id. at 142.
326 See id.at 136-68.

327 See id. at 167.
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"THE TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH [AFFiRis] THE

PRiMARY DUTY OF MAN TO FoLLow CONSCIENCE AS THE VOICE OF
GOD": NEGRE'S CASE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

Folowing receipt of a second set of orders, delivered verbally, not
in writing, to report for transshipment to Vietnam,3 2 81 Negre filed an
application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of habeas

corpus on February 14, 1969, in order to prevent his transport overseas and to obtain his release from service. 3s The government responded, and on March 6, 1969, the application was argued in federal
district court in San Francisco.3 3 0 On March 13, the district court de-

nied the application, agreeing with the Army's determination that
Negre's opposition to the Vietnam War was based on a personal code
and not on religious belief. 331 Negre then filed for a stay from the
court's order with both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in order to seek relief from the United States Supreme
Court.332 Justice William 0. Douglas, acting in his capacity as Circuit
Justice, granted Negre's stay on April 7, 1969.33
On April 21, 1969, the full Supreme Court rejected Negre's application for a stay, over Justice Douglas's dissent.3 m Negre had been
attempting to go through proper military channels in seeking his release, and Justice Douglas, a World War I veteran, saw the question
presented as "whether the federal courts have any oversight over
members of the Armed Forces when they are seeking to exhaust their
military administrative remedies." 33 5 Douglas subsequently rephrased
the issue more boldly: "Can a federal court 'in aid' of its jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1651, keep a member of the Armed Services from being
6
33
spirited out of the country?"
His efforts at obtaining a stay from the courts at an end, Louis
Negre shipped out for Vietnam the next day.33 7 According to Richard
Harrington, the Army "assigned four enlisted personnel to seize his
arms and legs and carry him on board the aircraft which carried him

328
329
(No.
330
331
332
333

See supra text accompanying note 48.
See Brief of the Appellees at 3, Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969)
24067).
Id. at 4.
See Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal at 9-11, Negre (No. 24067).
Brief of the Appellees at 4-5, Negre (No. 24067).
Negre v. Larsen, 394 U.S. 968, 968 (1969).

334 Id.
335 Id. at 968-69.
336 Id.at 969.
337 See G.I. Loses His Plea to Avoid War Duy, N.Y. T, tEs, Apr. 22, 1969, at 22; Oljector
Shipped to Vietnam, N.Y. Trmis, Apr. 23, 1969, at 35.
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to Vietnam." 3 3 8 Negre, however, continued to prosecute the merits of
his case in the courts by appealing to the Ninth Circuit the district
court's denial of habeas corpus. 339 He continued to be represented at

40
both the district court and appellate levels by Richard Harrington.3
The Ninth Circuit rejected Negre's claim to selective objection in

a per curiam decision issued in November 1969.341 The court's opin-

ion ignored entirely the just-war tradition-its reasoning amounting
to raw judicial fiat.
Our analytical view of the record reveals that appellant has a personal moral code based on his sociological and philosophical views,
rather than a conscientious objection to participation in war in any
form by reason of religious training and belief. He objects to the
342
war in Vietnam, not to all wars.
In February 1970, in a parallel development, the Northern District of California ruled in favor of a Catholic conscientious objector.343 Represented by Richard Harrington, James McFadden was a

former Catholic seminarian who was then a student of theology at the
University of San Francisco. 3 44 Advised by his spiritual director, John
8' 4
Tracy Ellis, the great church historian, "to follow his conscience, 1
McFadden took the position that "the war in Vietnam [was] an 'unjust' war and that it would therefore violate his conscience to submit
34 6
to induction."
Judge Alfonso Zirpoli, a Catholic, a graduate of Boalt Hall Law
School at the University of California-Berkeley, and an appointee to
the federal bench by John F. Kennedy, 347 grounded his decision in
McFadden on the Catholic conception of conscience.
338 Letter from Richard Harrington to Dr. CharlesJ. Reid, Jr., supra note 40, at 3
n.3.
339 Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969).
340

Id.

341 1d. The three judge panel consisted of Richard H. Chambers, an Eisenhower
appointee and ChiefJudge of the Ninth Circuit; Montgomery Oliver Koelsch, also an
Eisenhower appointee; and John F. Kilkenny, then a district court judge sitting by
designation, soon to be elevated to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by Richard
Nixon. See JUDGES oF THE UNITED STATES 66, 217-18, 223 (1979) (providing biographical information for Chambers, Kilkenny, and Koelsch).
342 Negre, 418 F.2d at 908.
343 See United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502, 508 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
344 See Letter from Richard Harrington to Dr. CharlesJ. Reid,Jr., supranote 40, at
3.
345

Id.

3.46 McFadden, 309 F. Supp. at 504.
347 See Reynolds Holding, Alfonso Zirpoli, S.F. CHRON., July 12, 1995, at A18; Wolfgang Saxon, Alfonso Zirpoli, FederalJudge, is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIME, July 13, 1995, at B1;
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This doctrine can be capsulized as follows: There exists a divine law.
This law is perceived by man through his conscience. When man
detects this law of God which is written in his conscience he must
obey its commands. If the laws of man are contrary to the law of
God, as seen through one's conscience, the individual must obey
God. 348
Zirpoli determined that McFadden's free exercise of religion was
threatened by induction.
The statute in question puts the most direct burden on the Catholic
selective objector-a criminal penalty. Direct restrictions on the exercise of one's religion have been upheld in the past, but those
cases dealt with the protection of society's health and morals from
affirmative acts required by religion.... However, in the instant
case defendant is not being restrained from doing an affirmative
act, rather, the Selective Service Act is commanding him to perform an

affirmative act-participation in a war which his conscience tells him
is unjust

349

Two weeks prior to the decision in McFadden, in late January of
1970, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Sisson.3 5 0 Although counsel for Sisson raised a number of broad chal-

lenges to the selective service laws-arguing not only that Congress
lacked the power to compel the service of selective objectors, but that
it lacked altogether the authority to conscript absent a declaration of
war 35 1 -a five member majority of the Court avoided the issue of selective objection, deciding the case on jurisdictional grounds.3 -52 In
dissent, Justice White chastised the majority: "[T]he issues raised by
Sisson are difficult and far-reaching ones, but they should be faced
and decided." 3 53 As if to answer White's criticism, the first footnote of
the majority opinion indicated that a writ of certiorari had been isMonica Valencia, Lauded FederalJudge Zirpoli, S.F. Ex,

-MIE, July 12, 1995, at All.
Derided by Richard Nixon for his conscientious objection decisions as "the worst
judge on the Federal bench," Saxon, supra,at BlI, Zirpoli was honored in 1980 by the

American Lawyer magazine as "the best jurist in the western United States," Valencia,
sup-a, at All. Zirpoli was also the judge who heard Negre's application for writ of

habeas corpus. See Brief of the Appellees at 5, Negre (No. 24067).
348 AcFadden, 309 F. Supp. at 504-05.
349 Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
350 399 U.9. 267 (1970). See the summary of oral arguments in Sisson reported at

38 U.S.L.W. 3273-76 (1970); see also supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (discussing the district court decision).
351 See Motion to Affirm 8-13, United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970) (No.
305); Brief for Appellee, Sisson (No. 305).

352 See Sisson, 399 U.S. at 269-308.
353

Id. at 349 (White, J., dissenting).
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sued to hear Negre's case, as well as that of Guy Gillette, "in order to

consider the 'selective' conscientious objector issue that underlies the
354
case now before us but which we cannot reach."

In the opening brief before the Supreme Court, Harrington,
joined on the brief by his law partner Leigh Athearn 35 , and by Stuart
Land, from the firm of Arnold & Porter,3 56 began with a constitutional
argument. There was no question that Negre was motivated to seek
conscientious objector status because of the teaching of his religious

faith. 357 An Army hearing officer had himself reached this conclusion.358 Reading broadly Seeger v. United States35 9 as allowing only in354 Id. at 270 n.1.
355 For Leigh Athearn, see the entry for Athearn, Chandler,and Hoffinan, 1 MARTIN.
DALE HUBBELL LAW DiREroRy 1193B (1970).
356 Land's current entry in Martindale Hubbell characterizes him as a specialist in
food and drug and medical device litigation. See 5 MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DniR G
TORY

DC47B (2000).

In an e-mail, Stuart Land recalls that he did not play a direct role in drafting the
briefs. He explains the extent of his own involvement.
I don't recall the circumstances but I remember getting involved very
late in the case shortly before the briefs were filed. I think I helped Richard
in his prepping for the oral and went to the oral argument....
I think I got involved because Richard wanted a Washington law firm to
help with the logistics and the firm he originally connected with backed out
because of a conflict at the last moment. Presumably, he learned or knew at
that time, that I had long been very active in the anti-war movement. Among
other things, I was the co-chair [of] the Lawyers Against the War, an ad hoc
group of lawyers mostly from D.C. and other parts of the east coast that was
actively campaigning against the war ....
For what it's worth, during this
period, because of my stance, I received a lot of inquiries from young men
and their parents seeking my assistance to help them obtain conscientious
objector status. As I recall, many of the men involved genuinely opposed the
war on moral or "just"war grounds (as I did), but in the absence of a strong
religiotis unselective anti-warjustification (e.g. Quakers) faced dimmed prospects of success. Some went to Canada, others joined the National Guard (if

they had the right connections) or took their chances with the draft num-

bers. It was an extremely difficult time to be a young man eligible for military service. I had hoped the Negre case would provide a breakthrough to
provide some opening of the extremely narrow limits recognized for conscientious objection, but it was not to be.
E-mail from-Stuart Land to Charles Reid (Feb. 9, 2001) (on file with CharlesJ. Reid,

Jr.).
357 See Opening Brief for Louis A. Negre, Petitioner at 1-10, Negre v. Larsen, 401
U.S. 437 (1971) (No. 325).
358 Id. at 11-12.
359 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Seeger had involved a petitioner who claimed conscientious objector status not on the basis of traditional religious belief, but on the basis of
his philosophical views. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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quiries into the sincerity of one's conscientious objections to war,3 6
Harrington, Athearn, and Land asserted that, in light of the Army's

own conclusions about Negre's beliefs, he should not be subjected to
legal disability "because of the particular phraseology or statement of
doctrine by Negre's religion as contrasted to the statement or doctrine of other religions such as those of the traditional pacifist
sects." 36 1 This line of reasoning, if it had Veen adopted, would have
had far-reaching implications, closing off all inquiries into the content
of religiously based objection and effectively placing selective objectors and pacifists on an equal footing.
The brief buttressed this argument by relying on Sherbert v. Ver62
ne
and McFadden. Sierbert taught that "it was unconstitutional to
compel the citizen to abandon one of the precepts of her religion on
the one hand or to forego the governmental benefit of unemployment compensation on the other hand." 63 More emphatically, McFadden taught that a believer should not be compelled to choose
between his beliefs and imprisonment.3 6 Negre's conduct was identical to that of a traditional pacifist objector. 365 Against the teaching of
Sherbert and McFadden, the brief alleged that the government sought
to impose on Negre a constitutionally unacceptable religious orthodoxy before he could qualify for statutory protection.
[T]he government in the present case seeks to deny Negre the benefit of discharge from military service not because of Negre's conduct, but solely because Negre will not surrender his belief: Namely,
his belief that the Catholic statement of theology in respect of war is
correct. The Government demands that Negre to qualify for discharge adopt the belief that the statement of theology of some traditional pacifist sect in respect of war is correct. Correspondingly, the
See Opening Brief for Louis A. Negre, Petitioner at 1-10, NXWn (No. 325).
i. at 12.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Opening Brief for Louis A. Negre, Petitioner at 14, Negre (No. 325).
Seeid.
See id. at 15.
[T]he conduct of the Catholic objector in refusing military service obedient
to conscience under his religion is identical ith the conduct of the member
of a traditional pacifist sect refusing military serice at the same place and
date. The government admits that a member of a traditional pacifist sect
would be entitled to discharge from military service upon a finding that his
beliefs were sincerely held and religious so long as the individual subscribed
to the statement of doctrine traditionally affirmed by members of such traditional pacifist sect.

360
361
362
363
364
365
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Government demands that Negre admit that Catholic teaching in
respect of service in war is erroneous. 3 6 6
The remainder of the brief addressed the legislative history and
judicial interpretation of the Military Selective Service Act's protection
of conscientious objectors.3 67 Noting that the statutory provision at
issue originated in Chiefjustice Hughes's dissent in Macintosh,168 the
brief maintained that it was clear Congress intended "to recognize religious training and belief and to refrain from imposing any religious
test as a condition of disability or benefit imposed by the government."3 69 The statute at issue protected those "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."37 0 Parsing this language,
the brief asserted that the phrase "in any form" should modify "partici-

pation," not "war."37 ' They continued by invoking the broad language employed by the Court in Welsh v. United States,372 seeking to
establish that religiously motivated objectors were entitled to special
consideration.3 7 3 And once again, the authors returned to the theme
of the discrimination Negre would suffer if his right to objector status
were denied.
Catholics, like Jehovah's Witnesses, follow God's commands over
those of man; and Catholics as set out in Negre's application for
discharge explicitly characterize conscience as representing the
voice of God. If participation in war violates the Catholic's conscience, Catholic doctrine is clear that the individual Catholic has a
duty to comply with his own conscience and to refuse military
service.
Petitioner in this case is no more required to become a Jehovah's Witness to qualify for exemption from military service than he
is required to become a Quaker: The First Amendment affords Petitioner equal protection in the exercise of his religious belief
when-in refusing military service which would violate con366 Id.
367 Id. at 19-38.
368 See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
369 Opening Brief for Louis A. Negre, Petitioner at 21, Negre (No. 325).
370 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994).
371 Opening Brief for Louis A. Negre, Petitioner at 35-36, Negre (No. 325).
372 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
373 See Opening Brief for Louis A. Negre, Petitioner at 28, Negre (No. 325).
"Whatever may be the limits of Constitutional and Congressional recognition of nonreligious conscientious objection, all justices of the Supreme Court found common
ground in Welsh v. United States, that Congress intended to exempt from military service men who objected based upon their religious training and belief." Id. (citation
omitted).
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science-the Catholic's conduct is the same as that of theJehovah's
37 4
Witness's or the Quaker's.

An amicus brief by the Executive Board of the National Federation of Priests' Councils filed on Negre's behalf made clear the urgency of the priests' interest in the case.
Priests by their vocation are called to counsel, train and guide the
faithful in matters pertaining to faith, morals and the formation of
conscience....
In counseling draft-aged youth, the priest is often caught in a
painful dilemma when confronted with a situation in which tie
young Catholic feels that his direct or indirect participation in a

particular war would be immoral. In guiding the young man to a
personal decision on the matter, the priest is placed in the dubious
position of having to counsel his subject to disregard the la,, in order to follow a belief which results from religious training, or to
disregard that belief in order to follow the law....
The interest of priests in the present case is particularly sharp
because they are in jeopardy of prosecution for counseling Catholic
selective objectors to refuse military service, if the selective service
laws are construed to disqualify Catholic selective objectors from exemption. For the Catholic religion unequivocally requires priests to
counsel the faithful to follow conscience in respect of military service, whether or not civil law makes any provision for following
conscience.3 75
The Priests' Councils' brief stressed "that the Catholic has a religious duty to refuse military service in certain cases; namely in any form
in a war which he in conscience has concluded does not meet the tests
fixed by his religion to permit participation in war."37G The Catholic
conscientious objector "in refusing military service is submitting to the
moral power of divine law as he perceives it in conscience under his
religion, exactly as is the conscientious objector from a traditional
pacifist sect who perceives divine law in his conscience." 377 To deny
protection to the Catholic while conferring legal status on the traditional peace-church objector would violate the American constitutional order. "Any law or regulation which seeks to impose disability

or punishment upon an individual solely for his religious beliefs and

374 Id. at 35.
375 Brief of Executive Board of the National Federation of Priests' Councils-Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Negre (No. 325).
376 Id. at 20.
377 Id. at 21.
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not for his conduct is unconstitutional as a violation of the First and
3' 78
Fifth Amendments.
An amicus brief submitted by the National Council of Churches
emphasized the unique position of the Catholic objector, who could
not categorically pronounce against all war, but who was rather
obliged by the tenets of faith to examine the merits of a particular war
before giving or withholding support.
Negre could not, on the basis of his religious belief, claim exemption as a conscientious objector prior to his application for discharge from the Army. His Roman Catholic training compelled no
such action until he had an opportunity to examine the factual situation pertaining to the war in Vietnam, to draw a conclusory opinion, on the basis of his training and conscience, as to the justness of
that war, and until he was faced with the imminent prospect of di79
3
rect, personal participation in that war alone.

"Participation in war," the brief continued, "is an inescapable subject
matter for religion and for the human conscience which derives its
content from religious training and belief."38 0 By discriminating between Negre's claims and those of other conscientious objectors, the
government "was entering upon forbidden inquiries in the field of
conscience." 3 8 1
Other amici briefs made similar points. A brief by the American
Friends Service Committee recalled the conscientious dissent of early
Quakers like George Fox and William Penn and asserted that Negre,
should be protected in his act of conscience. 38 2 A brief by the American Jewish Congress stressed that "[l]imiting exemption from military
service on the basis of conscientious objection to those whose objection is to all wars constitutes preferential treatment of adherents of
some religious or ethical systems over others in violation of the NoEstablishment Clause of the First Amendment. 3 8s3 Noting that Judaism, like Catholicism, "is not a religion of traditional padfism, 3'' 8' 4 the
brief went on to assert thatJews, like Catholics, are bound to examine
their consciences on the subject of the justice or injustice of particular
378
379
U.S.A.
380
381
382
325).
383
384

Id. at 19.
Brief Amicus Curiae by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the
Joined by Eight of Those Churches at 12, Negre (No. 325).
Id. at 21.
Id.
Brief of the American Friends Service Committee-Amicus Curiae, Negre (No.
Brief of American Jewish Congress Amicus Curiae at 5, Negre (No. 325).
Id. at 11.
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submitted on behalf of Louis P. Font, a devout Methodist, a West
Point honors graduate, and a religious selective objector, drew parallels between Font's situation and Louis Negre's.. 0 A brief by a private
attorney, George Altman, whose interest in the case was based on his
involvement in similar cases, attacked the Vietnam War as an ideological struggle of an essentially different character than the sort of war
7

contemplated by the statute.-8

Representing the government was Erwin Griswold, formerly the
dean of Harvard Law School, appointed Solicitor General in 1967 by
3
LyndonJohnson and now retained in that office by Richard Nixon. 8
Religiously, Griswold described himself as "at heart a Christian,"Ms al-

though he also conceded that his skepticism about conventional religious doctrine could lead others to call him "a humanist or some sort
of agnostic."3 90 Griswold's early career, prior to joining the Harvard

Law School faculty in the fall of 1934, was taken up in public service,
and he continued to perform public service in the years of his deanship, from 1946 to 1967.391 Appointed to the United States Civil
Rights Commission byJohn Kennedy in the summer of 1961,392 Gris-

wold distinguished himself, according to Theodore Hesburgh, who
served with him, in breaking the back of the discriminatory use of

385 Id at 11-15.
386 See Brief of Louis P. Font, Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Negre (No. 325).
387 See Motion for Leave to File a BriefAmicus Curiae at 1, Negre (No. 325). Citing
language in Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), Altman asserted:
[I]t is readily observable that the Vietnam conflict is... not "between na-

tions;" it is strictly a war against an ideology, a sort of crusade, like those so in
fact entitled, the "Crusades" of the 12th and 13th centuries.... The "enemy" is not a "nation," nor even the citizens or members of a nation. It is
the individuals in and around Vietnam, however organized, who believe in,
or are sympathetic to, or support, a given economic ideology.
It.at 3-4.
388 See ERWIN N. G~rswoLD, OULD FIELDS, Nrw CoRNE: THE PERoS.u. MEMOIRS oF
A TWErImTH CENTURY L4%,sR 150, 262, 270 (1992).
389 Id. at 31.
390 Id. Griswold explains some of the tensions inherent in his view of religion. "I
particularly dislike the symbolism of the 'Body and Blood of Christ,' and found, as I
learned more about it, that religious strife through the centuries had been useless,
inhumane, and essentially irreligious, as I saw it." Id. "[B]affled by the Trinity, and
particularly by 'the Holy Ghost,'" Griswold also acknowledged "[finding] much of the
teaching of Christ encouraging and inspiring." Id.
391 Id. at 195.
392 Id. at 245.
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literacy tests to deprive African-Americans of the right to vote.3 93 It
was now Griswold's task to defend the government's position that the
selective service laws did not improperly operate to deprive Catholics
and other just-war objectors of their rights.
Joining Griswold on the brief were Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney
General and Chief of the Criminal Division of the Department of'Justice, and William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant to the Solicitor General.3 94 Wilson had distinguished himself in World War II, serving in

Australia, New Guinea, and Luzon, 3 95 and had subsequently made a
reputation for himself as an aggressive prosecutor in Texas, where in
1960 he was named the nation's leading state attorney general.3 90 A
"stern moralist, ''s9 7 Wilson was forced to resign from the Justice De-

partment a year after Negre when he was implicated in a series of questionable financial dealings. 398 Reynolds, for his part, a descendant on
his father's side of the sixteenth-century Pilgrim governor of Massachusetts William Bradford and on his mother's a descendant of the du
Pont family, graduated from Yale College and Vanderbilt Law School
in the mid-1960s, but did not serve in the military.3 9 9 He would later
serve a controversial tenure as assistant attorney general for civil rights
in the 1980s. 40 0 Also on the brief were staff attorneys Beatrice Rosen40 1

berg and Richard Rosenfield.
Griswold and his team at an early stage in the process made the
decision to treat Negre's case as indistinguishable, legally, from that of
Guy Gillette, whose case was joined with his at the time certiorari was
granted. Indeed, the Solicitor General's Office submitted identical

393 See Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, In Memoriam: Enin Nathaniel Griswold,
108 HARv. L. REV. 979, 992-94 (1995).
394 See Brief for the United States at 35, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (No.

325).
395 See Wilson,

W11l, WHO'S WHO IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST

1973-1974, at 826

(13th ed. 1973).
396 See Taint in theJusice Department,TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 12, 12.
397 A. James Reichley, The Fall of Will Wilson, FORTUNE, Dec. 1971, at 99, 99.
398 Id.
399 See Reynolds, William Bradford, CURRENT BIOGRAPHY YEARBOOK 1988, at 476
(Charles Moritz ed., 1988). While a member of the Solicitor General's Office, Reynolds was the principal author of forty Supreme Court briefs. Id.
400 See generally RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS,
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS (1996).
401 See Brief for the United States at 35, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (No.
325).
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briefs in response to the very different claims presented by the two
4 02
parties.

The two cases, however, were different in significant respects.
While Negre's objection was grounded on Catholic principles ofjustwar thought, Gillette's was based on his belief in a non-religious "Humanism" which stressed love and respect for one's fellow creatures
and a confidence in human perfectibility. 403 While Negre raised important constitutional questions of free exercise and establishment of
religion, Gillette relied upon the 1965 decision in Seeger extending
statutory protection to those who grounded their objections to military service on non-theistic belief systems which filled in their lives a
place comparable to the religious believer's faith in God. 4"° While
Negre sought to place the legal treatment of Catholics on the same
footing as Jehovah's Witnesses or Quakers, 405 counsel for Gillette invoked notions of equality of treatment between believers and non-believers40 6 and the history of the treatment of conscientious objectors
in American law.40 7 By choosing to submit identical briefs in response
in these very different cases, the Solicitor in effect asserted that none
of these differences was relevant to the outcome of the case. Tactically, this decision had a notable advantage: it allowed the Court to
narrow its focus to statutory considerations and to exclude from its
fi-ame of reference difficult constitutional challenges raised by Negre's
counsel.
The Solicitor's brief proposed two arguments for the Court's consideration. 40 8 The first, drawn from analysis of the Selective Senice
Act, claimed that "[t]he historical evolution of the statutory exemption... was not intended to reach, and has never been construed so
broadly as to reach, the individual who conscientiously opposes the
particular war of the moment, no matter how sincere his objection or
religious his motivation." 40 9 Phrased in this way, the brief took ac402 Compare id., with Brief for the United States, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971) (No. 85).
403 See Letter from Guy Gillette to Local Board No. 8 (Apr. 29, 1967) (on file with

the record and briefs from Giette, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)). "Humanism," Gillette wrote,
"essentially means respect and love for man, faith in his inherent goodness and
perfectability, and confidence in his capability to improve some of the pains of the
human condition." Id.
404 See Brief for Petitioner at 14-24, Gillte (No. 85).
405 See supra text accompanying note 374.
406 Brief for Petitioner at 38-56, Gillette (No. 85).
407

Id. at 56-73.

408 See Brief for the United States at 10-12, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(No. 325).
409 I. at 10.
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count of the possibility of a class of religious objectors not covered by
the statute, seemingly unaware of the religious-liberty and equal-protection hazards posed by such discrimination.
In its second argument, attacking the basis of Negre's and Gillette's constitutional claims, the brief reverted to the distinction made
by the Marshall Commission between conscientious objectors to all
war, "whose beliefs... categorically forbid killing in war," 410 and those
who grounded their objections on "varied personal judgments on national policy based on the same political, sociological and economic
factors that the government necessarily considered in reaching its decision to wage a particular war." 411 Denouncing the petitioners' free
exercise claims, the brief relied without citation on the distinction,
made famous in Reynolds v. United States,4 12 between constitutionally
protected beliefs and unprotected acts. "However untrammeled may
be the freedom to believe, religious freedom does not require that
religious scruples be recognized as justifying disobedience to a valid
law." 413 To allow Negre's petition would entail an expansion of free
exercise "to encompass a general right of conscience to object to and
refuse to comply with specific governmental policies," an outcome
that "would logically lead to a situation destructive of orderly
government .... 1"414
Elaborating upon the statutory argument, Griswold's brief incorporated by reference the historiography of conscientious objection
found in the government's brief in Seeger and reproduced as a supplement to the government's brief in Welsh. 415 An account of the efforts
of Congress and the States to exempt from military service traditional
religious pacifists, 416 the document was read as supporting the proposition that "[n]ever, in all the years in which Congress has recognized conscientious objection as a basis for exemption from military
service has it extended the privilege to persons other than those who
were total pacifists-that is, opposed to all forms of war."417 The brief
went on to argue that the language of the statute-protecting conscientious objectors to "war in any form"-"lends itself to but one inter410 Id. at 11.
411

412
413
414
415
States
416
417

Id.

98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
Brief for the United States at 11, Negre (No. 325).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 15. Compare id. at 15, with Brief for the United States at 41-60, United
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (No. 50).,
See Brief for the United States at 41-60, Seeger (No. 50).
Brief for the United States at 15-16, Negre (No. 325).
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pretation-that exempt status depends on a 'religious' conscientious
4
objection to participation in any shooting war in any form.""

8

In its constitutional analysis, the Griswold brief led with Justice
Sutherland's majority opinion in UnitedStates v. Macintosh.4"' Exemption from military obligation is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate. 4 20 To be sure, however, Congress must not violate
42
the First Amendment's teaching on establishment or free exercise. '
Responding first to establishment concerns, the brief asserted that
congressional exemption was intended
to accommodate, rather than to establish, religion. It chose to recognize that group of persons who for reasons of conscience reject
killing as an instrument of national policy for all situations, and, in
deference to their religious beliefs, to spare them the hardship 4that
would result if they were required to perform military service. 2
The brief then refined and restated the Marshall Commission's
majority report rejecting selective objection without indicating its reliance on that document. 423 The "underlying purpose" of the statute
was "to recognize a qualitative difference between general and selec42 4
tive objection without regard to religion."
Opposition to a particular war necessarily involves a political judgment, an individual conclusion that the policy adopted by the duly
elected government is wrong at a certain time in relation to a particular area of operations. While the personal response to that determination may well be religiously and conscientiously motivated, it
rests in the first instance on a decision that is political and
particular.
Unaddressed in this analysis was the issue of equality of treatment
of religious believers of different types. Could the Congress constitutionally relieve Quakers from the obligation of military service while
requiring service from Catholics, on the basis of their differing religious beliefs? Instead of answering this concern, the brief considered
the policy disaster that would result from judicial recognition of selective objection.
418 Id. at 21.
419 Id. at 22-23 (discussing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)).
420 Id. at 23 (discussing and quoting Afacinosh, 283 U.S. at 623-24).
421

Id. at 22.

422
423
424
425

Id. at 23.
See id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 24-25 (citation omitted).
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Without regard to the source of such a selective objection-whether
religious in a narrow or broad sense or otherwise-there are compelling reasons of general policy for not establishing such an exemption from military service. Most fundamentally, any such
exemption-based as it would necessarily be upon changeable political judgments of the moment-would be inconsistent with the con4 26
cept of uniform, and hence, fair, principles of exemption.
A parade of horribles would follow from acceptance of the principle. The absence of a bright line test for exemption would lead to a

whole series of problems in determining the appropriateness of a
given request for exemption.4 27 "[A]dministrative problems and delays.., would necessarily hinder the achievement of the basic objective of the Selective Service System-to raise necessary military
manpower for the national defense. ' 428 "These considerations, all secular rather than religious ... provide ample basis for the legislative
judgment to excuse only those persons whose beliefs cause them to
oppose participation in all wars and not those persons who assert the
4 29
right to choose the war in which they will fight."'
The brief then addressed the free exercise issue.
Most religions (and their humanistic equivalents) recognize that
there are areas in which individual conscience governs the application of religious (or humanistic) doctrine to particular circumstances. Accordingly, there are numerous areas in which citizens
can state that, as a matter of conscience based in religious principles, they object to political decisions of the government,just as petitioners do here. But that cannot permit such religiously derived
views to prevail over national policy and justify non-compliance with
430
the law.
The brief acknowledged that Sherbert v. Verner might stand against
its position, but claimed that the governmental interest asserted was
"compelling" for at least three reasons and so should overcome the
petitioners' reliance on that case. 43 1 The interest at stake was "not
merely one of administrative convenience or the need for some degree of certainty in providing necessary military manpower,' 1 32 "[n] or
is it limited to the interest in uniform, and hence fair, administration
426 Id. at 26.
427 See id. at 26-28.
428 Id. at 28.
429 Id.
430 Id. at 30-31.
431 Id. at 32.
432 Id.
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of the draft laws." 43 3 Even more important than these justifications,
"Congress also has a responsibility to preserve the governmental integrity by not allowing political dissent, no matter how sincerely and religiously motivated, to excuse a person from the duties lawfully
imposed by the government on all persons in the same class." 43 The
failure to appreciate the religious foundations of Catholicjust-war objection could not have been more strikingly put.
Indeed, extension of constitutional protection to religiously-motivated selective objectors, the brief alleged, would have untold devas-

tating consequences on civil society itself.
[I]f [conscientious objection] is given such a sweeping scope, it
would of necessity extend beyond the Selective Service context and

reach untold other governmental policies as to which an individual
claimed, as a matter of religious motivation, to be conscientiously
opposed. Such a construction of the First Amendment would be
undestructive of the orderly functioning of government and would
43
dermine the essential integrity of the democratic process. 5

On December 4, 1970, a reply brief on behalf of Louis Negre was
filed with the Supreme Court, authored by John Noonan. 4 36 A
Harvard Law School graduate, Noonan had assisted Erin Griswold in
a tax case in the summer of 1953, between his second and third
years. 43 7 Recently appointed to the faculty of lav at Boalt Hall, the law
school at the University of California-Berkeley, Noonan had by that
time established himself as the foremost scholar in the English-speaking world on the subject of the interaction of history, laiv, and the
development of Catholic doctrine. Influenced during his graduate
study byJohn Courtney Murray's teaching on the freedom of the religious conscience, Noonan would subsequently make religious freedom a focus of his own work. 438 Noonan's doctoral dissertation,
published in substantially expanded form by Harvard University Press
in 1957, had examined the means by which Catholic teaching had
evolved from moral condemnation of the taking of interest on a loan
433 Id. at 33.
434 Id.
435 Id. at 32.
436 See Reply Brief on Behalf of Petitioner, Negre (No. 325).
437 See Letter from John T. Noonan, United States CircuitJudge, to Dr. CharlesJ.
Reid, Jr., supra note 42, at 1. Noonan relates an encounter he had with Griswold at
the time of oral argument in Negr "When he encountered me in the corridors of the
Supreme Court at the time of the Negre argument he said, 'I wish I could cross-examine you.' He was being candid notjocose." Id.
438 See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 26, 28-29.

1940
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to acceptance of the practice. 4 39 His work on contraception, published in the final year of the Second Vatican Council, argued on the
basis of history for a modification of the Church's traditional condemnation of birth control and received the John Gilmary Shea award as
the year's best publication on the subject of Catholic history.440 In the
fall of 1970, Noonan was two years away from completing Power to Dissolve,44A which would earn for him a second John Gilmary Shea
award. 442 Noonan would now bring to bear on Negre's case his training and massive learning as a lawyer and historian.
Noonan's brief responded to both the statutory and constitutional claims of the government brief. Noonan commenced his statutory analysis by challenging the historiography upon which the
government brief relied.4 43 The government brief not only misunderstood the founding documents such as the Continental Congress's admonition to the States to respect the religious objections of those who
"cannot bear Arms in any case," 44 4 but also failed to appreciate the
argument of the Seeger brief which it incorporated by reference and
made its own.44 5 Indeed, the Solicitor's brief now repudiated what
the Seeger brief acknowledged was the central value of the conscientious objection statute.
The core of the exemption for conscientious objectors is the unwillingness of the Congress, speaking the true will of the American people, to punish as a criminal a man who refuses to perform military
service in obedience to what he believes is the command of God
44 6
transmitted by divine revelation.
See generallyJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957).
See generallyJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CoNTRcm EnON: A HISTORY OF ITS TnAT.
MENT BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS (1965).
441 See generally NOONAN, supra note 16.
442 See REPORT OF THE CoMMrrrEE ON THE JOHN Gn.Nm, SHEA PRiZE, 59 CArn.
Hisr. REv. 43 (1973) (documenting Noonan's receipt of theJohn Gilmary Shea award
for Power to Dissolve).
443 See Reply Brief on Behalf of Petitioner at 20-23, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437
1(1971) (No. 325).
444 "The Solicitor General fastens upon the phrase 'people who from Religious

439
440

Principles cannot bear Arms in any case' as evidence of an intent to discriminate

against Catholics and other just-war objectors. But he cites no debate, correspondence or evidence to support that interpretation." Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
445 Id. at 19.
446 Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 35, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965) (No. 50)). The Seeger brief continued, "The unwillingness of the American people to compel a man to disobey a divine command and yield to a human
obligation imposed by government is older than the Nation." Id. (quoting Brief for
the United States at 35, Seeger (No. 50)).
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The Solicitor's brief, furthermore, failed to appreciate the context of conscientious objection in the founding period. The period
was one in which religious intolerance and bigotry might sometimes
be openly and frankly expressed. "[T]he colonial assemblies were
well aware how to write religious intolerance into law." 447 Persecution
of Catholics in the colonial period was often sharp and sometimes
bloody. 4- s The fact that General George Washington counseled the
Protestant troops in his command to avoid insults to Catholics should
be the appropriate context in which to read the Continental Con4 49
gress's resolutions, or, for that matter, the First Amendment
It was therefore most improbable that the First Amendment drafted
just at the time when Catholics first had attained general toleration
in the colonies was intended to sanction punishment of Catholicsin the field of military service or any other-merely because the
Catholics followed their traditional acceptance of the authority of
the teaching of the Pope and the Church in matters of faith and
morals.45 0
Subsequent treatment of conscientious objectors, in the Civil War
and in World War

][,

4

5

evinced no intention to discriminate against

Catholics merely "because their Church taught a just war doctrine
rather than total pacifism." 45 2 Negre's beliefs were judged by the
Army "to be very devout,"453 and this should suffice to obtain his

discharge.
Having considered the context in which conscientious objection
legislation should be understood, Noonan turned to the language of
the statute itself and the circumstances that gave rise to the statute's
drafting. The statute under consideration, Noonan observed, was the
447 Id. at 20.
448 See id. at 21 (giving the example of Puritan persecutions of Catholics in Maryland, which resulted in the execution of Catholics and the confiscation of Catholic
lands).

449 See id. at 22.
450 Id.
451 See id. at 23. Glossing the World War II draft act and its exemption for conscientious objection, Noonan observed:
Again, Congress did not display any intent to compel Catholic objectors to
violate their duty of obedience to God as perceived in conscience. Rather
Congress was concerned to distinguish the bona fide religious objector
"without opening the doors to every slacker who, without any sincere and
long-established convictions might declare his so-called conscientious
scruples in order to avoid service."
Id. (quoting from 55 CONG. REc. 1478-79 (1917)).
452 Id.
453 Id.
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result of Chief Justice Hughes's dissent in Macintosh. The Solicitor's
Brief attempted to limit the significance of Macintosh by noting that it
was an immigration case. 45 4 Noonan rejected this attempted
distinction.
That Chief Justice Hughes expressed his views in an immigration
case, Maclntosh, is hardly a distinction since Congress saw fit to
adopt his views by copying his language in the Selective Service Act
of 1948.... ChiefJustice Hughes' opinion in MacIntosh was highly
sensitive to the religious issue. The crux of his opinion is the long
history of Congressional recognition that "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been
maintained....
[T]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to
God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
455
relation."
Hughes, Noonan observed, endorsed selective conscientious objection in his Macintosh opinion. 4 56 The government brief, however,
attempted to subvert Hughes's analysis, even though the statute being
glossed was derived from the language of Hughes's dissent. "The government in the present case thus finds itself making the curious contention that when Congress adopted the language of Chief Justice

Hughes in Macintoshin the 1948 Act, that Congress was so inept that it
intended the result opposite that proposed by Chief Justice
Hughes."45 7
Noonan closed his statutory analysis by looking to the Report of
the Director of Selective Service, dated April 1943, at the height of
World War II.458 "[A]t the basis of conscientious objection," the Re-

port read, "[is] the very simple statement of the New Testament: 'It is

better to obey God rather than man."

45 9

"[I]f the individual regards

his acts as his answer to a call from God or as God's will, in accordance
with his religious training and belief, then the Nation in accordance
454 Brief for the United States at 19-20 n.12, Negre (No. 325).
455 Reply Brief on Behalf of Petitioner at 24, Negre (No. 325) (quoting United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
456 Id. at 25. Noonan quoted from Hughes's dissenting opinion:
Nor is there ground, in my opinion, for the exclusion of Professor Macintosh because his conscientious scruples have particular reference to wars believed to be unjust. . . . [T]here would seem to be no reason why a
reservation of religious or conscientious objection to participation in wars
believed to be unjust should constitute such a disqualification.
Id. (quoting Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 635 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
457 Id.
458 See id. at 25-26.
459 Id. at 25 (quoting SEErvE SERVICE IN WARTIME, SECOND REPORT OF Ti-. Di.
RECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE,

1941-1942, at 256, 258 (1943)).
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with its tradition, feels bound to recognize it.'1460 Thus the Report
rejected the proposition that Catholics lacked any basis for conscien-

tious objection, preferring "a more liberal view, based upon a conclusion that the definitions of religion and the variety of religious
experience are so nearly infinite in number as to make futile any attempt to say whether this or that one met the laIv."4 6 1 Noonan
observed,
The generous spirit of religious tolerance recognized by General
[Lewis] Hershey and the Selective Service System in 1943 in an
hour of supreme national crisis conforms much better to the great
American tradition of a free people in a free country, than the
rather ungenerous interpretation asserted by the government in the
462
present case.
Noonan contended that this liberality was sorely lacking in the
government's treatment of Louis Negre. The Army and the Ninth
Circuit both rejected Negre's claim, declaring his position to represent "a personal moral code," rather than "a conscientious objection..., by reason of religious training and belief." 4613 This assertion,
repeated in the government's brief, "fails the tests of logic, of history,
and of support in the record."4 64 Logically, Noonan noted:
[A] total objector equally with a selective objector certainly will
make the "judgment, an individual conclusion, that the policy
adopted by the duly elected government is wrong at a certain time
in relation to a particular area of operations." Any individual who
concludes that a war to which his attention is directed violates the

commands of God can scarcely be expected to applaud the political
decision of his country to participate in the war....
A national decision to go to war is as much a political decision
for the total pacifist as it is for the selective objector. Indeed many
political decisions have a religious significance.... The question
under section 6j) therefore is not whether the government decision to engage in war is political, but whether the individual's objection is based upon his religious training and belief, or arises solely
from his politics.465
460

Id. (quoting SELECTIVE

SERVICE IN WARTIME, SECOND REPORT OF TiE DIRECTOR

1941-1942, at 256, 258 (1943)).
461 Id at 26 (quoting SELECTrvE SERvicE IN WxRmnE, SECOND RErowr OF THE DI.
RECTOR OF SELEGTIVE SERVICE, 1941-1942, at 256, 258 (1943)).
462 Id.
463 Id. at 10 (quoting Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908, 909 (9th Cir. 1969)).
464 Id. at 10.
465 Id. at 10-11 (quoting Brief for the United States at 24-25, Negre (No. 325)).
OF SELECTnVE SERVICE,
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Case law, Noonan continued, has recognized that "political, sociological, philosophical or personal moral objections to war do not disqualify the objector who also has a religious basis for his objection to
participation in war."466 The Supreme Court should affirm these
precedents.
Historically, Noonan asserted, "[t]he Catholic's religious duty to
obey conscience is scarcely a new doctrine of the Church."1467 Noonan
quoted from St. Jerome's admonition to Roman soldiers to obey "[i]f
what the emperor and presiding officers command is good .... But if
it is evil and against God, answer him with those words from the Acts
of the Apostles, 'It is necessary to obey God rather than men."' 468 He
then turned to Catholic just-war thought to demonstrate the unanimity of the tradition's opposition to killing in unjust wars. Francisco de
Vitoria, in his "classic exposition ofjust war theory,"469 taught that all
persons were conscientiously obliged to refrain from participating in
unjust wars "for it is not lawful to kill the innocent by any authority
whatsoever." 470 "The most influential of all Catholic moral theologians," Alphonsus de Ligouri, taught much the same doctrine, maintaining that a "soldier [who concluded that he was participating in an
unjust war] is unable to receive the sacrament of Penance and the
sacrament of the Eucharist unless he is attempting 'as quicldy as possible' (quamprimum potest) to obtain his release from the army. '47 1 The
Baltimore Catechism, by treating just war as an exception to the Fifth
Commandment's prohibition on killing, also limited the circum-

stances in which Catholics may lawfully participate in war. 472
Noonan concluded this line of analysis by reminding his readers
not only of the deep origins of the Church's just-war tradition but of
the Court's obligation to provide Catholics relying upon that tradition

with constitutional protection.
The teaching of the Catholic church has been consistent for nearly
two thousand years in affirming the primary duty of man to follow
conscience as the voice of God, and to refuse to kill Where taking
life violates conscience. If in the heat of defense of a much-criti466
467
468
Migne

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13 (quoting St.Jerome, On Titus, 3:1, in 26
ed.)).

PATROLOGIA LkTINA

626 (J.P.

469 Id.
470 Id. (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio VI de Indis, sive De iure belli Hispanorum
in barbaros, in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435-37 (Simon ed., 1917)); see

supra notes 170-203 and accompanying text.
471 Reply Brief on Behalf of Petitioner at 14, Negre (No. 325).
472 Id.
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cized war the government can prevail with its contention that these
teachings of the Catholic church are "political" rather than "religious," one can only wonder what life is left in the freedom of relig-

ion guaranteed by the First Amendment which has been 4the
pride
73
of the American commonwealth for nearly twvo centuries.
Noonan also examined the record to lay bare the deep roots of

Negre's own belief system in Catholic doctrine.4 74 Noonan commenced by challenging squarely the contention that Negre's position
was motivated by politics, not by theological insight.475 In fact, as a
believing Catholic, Negre was under a moral obligation to follow papal teaching on just war. Pius XII, John XXIII, Paul VI, and the Second Vatican Council all taught that Catholics were obliged to obey the
commands of the state in ajust war, but that they were equally obliged
to refrain from fighting in an unjust conflict.470 "The defect in
Negre's views," which exposed him to criminal liability, Noonan
crisply observed, is "that Paul VI and the Fathers of the Sacred Council can conceive ofjust wars and that Negre if he remains a Catholic
will have a duty as a Catholic to participate in any such wars if they
ever OCCUr."

4 77

Noonan illustrated the choice that Negre confronted: He was, of
course, free to disregard the binding character of the teaching author-

ity of popes and councils, but "[t]he only theological difficulty with
doing so is that Negre is no longer a Catholic if he denies that the
teaching of the Pope is binding upon his conscience." 478 The claim of
the Solicitor General that the Selective Service Act is neutral is thus

"untenable."479 Noonan put the choice the Court confronted in stark
terms.
The blunt fact is that if the Solicitor General's construction [of the

statute] is accepted by this court, none of this nation's 44 million
odd Catholics is eligible for exemption as a conscientious
objector....

473

Id. at 15.

474 See id. at 3-9.
475 See id. at 3-4.
476 See id&at 4-7. "[T]he theological gist of the teaching of Paul VI in the Pastoral
Constitution [is] that a Catholic has a religious duty to [discriminate between just

wars in which he has a religious duty to] participate and unjust wars in which he has a
religious duty to refuse to participate." Id. at 7.
477 Id. at 6-7.
478 Id. at 8.
479 Id. at 9.
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It is up to this court to determine whether the First Amendment to the Constitution permits the blatant form of religious dis48 0
crimination proposed by the government in the present case.
V.

"WE HAVE ON ONE OF PETITIONER'S B~iEus AN AUTHORITATIVE

LAY CATHOLIC SCHOLAR, DR. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.": THE JUDGMENT
OF THE SUPREME COURT

The week in which the Negre case was argued before the Supreme
Court was understood by contemporaries to have been a quiet week in
Vietnam. Only twenty-seven American servicemen were killed that
week, the second lowest number of the year to that point.48 1 One
hundred ninety-five Americans were wounded, while South
Vietnamese forces lost 390 killed and 937 wounded. 4 2 Communist
losses totaled 1425 killed. 48 3 Domestically, the great passions of the
1960s were playing out. Although Richard Nixon's program of
Vietnamization would fail militarily, it did succeed in reducing the exposure of American troops to the hazards of combat, thereby relieving
domestic political pressures. By December 31, 1970, only 280,000
American troops remained in Vietnam, down nearly half from the
highpoint reached in 1968.484
Oral argument took place on December 9, 1970.485 Gillette was
argued first, with Conrad Lynn 48 6 representing Guy Gillette and Erwin
Griswold presenting the government's case. 48 7 Lynn made the case
that his client, like Negre, would be unfairly disadvantaged if denied
protection by the statute. 48 "To construe [the statute] as covering
only traditional pacifists," Lynn asserted, violated the Constitution's
prohibition on religious establishments by preferring one sect over
another. 489 Just-war adherents should be protected, Lynn continued,
and if they are, then protection should also be given to humanists. 49 0
480 Id.
481 U.S. War Deaths Down by 5 to 27, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1970, at 11.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484

See KARNow, supra note 211, at 697-98 (giving the 1968 and 1970 troop

figures).
485 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
486 See Lynn's memoirs, CONRAD LYNN,THERE 1S A FOUNTAIN: Tui Auroioa1'm'
OF A

CIVL RiGHTs

LAvYER

194-95 (1979), for his recollections of the case.

487 See Arguments Before the Court- Conscientious Objectors: Objections to Vietnam War;
Meaningof "Participatingin War in Any Form". Impact of FreeExercise Clause;Just-war Theory as Basisfor Valid Objection, 39 U.S.L.W. 3253 (Dec. 15, 1970).
488 See id.
489 Id.
490

See id.
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Attempting to turn the government's policy argument on its head,

Lynn "pointed out that the grant of conscientious objector status to
individuals such as Gillette would increase the morale and efficiency
of the armed services. It is obvious ...

that the presence of sincere

objectors create[s] severe discipline and morale problems in the
service." 49 1
Solicitor General Griswold followed the presentation of Gillette's
49 2
counsel by returning oral argument to the language of the statute.
"The clear language of the statute," Griswold asserted, "rejects the
idea of selective objection. It states that one must be opposed to participation in war in any form. It is the government's position that the

words 'in any form' modify 'war' not 'participation.'"493 In discussing
the history of conscientious objection, Griswold acknowledged that
"all of our early legislation... was in terms of numbers of the historic
peace churches: the Quakers, the Mennonites and others, all of whom
were opposed to war in any circumstance."4 94 Griswold conceded that
"[i]n our modem view the exemption cannot be limited to members
of particular churches. It must be extended to all those whose views
are 'religious' in a broad and deeply-held sense, including humanism." 495 But, Griswold continued, Congress has plenary power over
the decision to confer conscientious objector status under its authority to raise and support armies, 49 6 and by deciding to grant exemption
to those opposed to all forms of war "Congress is seeking to accommo-

The same ethical considerations apply when a just war adherent or a Humanist objector such as Gillette makes a moral decision about a particula'r
war as when a Quaker decides that he cannot fight in any war. The Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires that all individuals be atlowed to exercise their religious beliefs freely.

Id.
491 Id.
492 See id.
493 Id.

494 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (No. 85), microfored on The Complete Oral Arguments of ie Supreme Court
of the United States: 1970 Term (University Publications of America).
495 Id.

496 Id. at 22-27. Griswold cited as authority for this proposition the majority opinion in United States v. Macintosl, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), and the case of Hamilton v.
Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). See id.
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date rather than to establish religion." 497 Rejecting the discrimination
argument without engaging it, Griswold stated:
In excluding selective objectors there is no religious difference, no
religious discrimination; no one is called because he holds a particular religion; no one is exempted because he holds a particular religion. What the statute does is to recognize a qualitative difference
between general and selective objection without regard to religion
4 98
if the claim is deeply and sincerely held.

Omitted in this analysis was any recognition of the claim that it
was precisely because a particular believer was Catholic and an adherent ofjust-war thought that he would be called to service instead of a
Quaker who objected to all war. To be sure, a Catholic would not be
drafted simply because he was a Catholic; he would be drafted because his Catholic beliefs were not accorded the same legislative respect as a Quaker's. Congress, on this interpretation of the statute,
was empowered to distinguish between theological perspectives, conferring benefits on one and withholding the same benefits from
another.
Griswold, however, did not engage these equal protection or establishment concerns. He closed his argument in Gillette by emphasizing the grave dangers in accepting the petitioners' argument.
Religiously-derived views do not prevail over national policy and justify noncompliance with the law. A contrary view would extend to
the paying of taxes, to compliance with laws for the education of
children, to health laws and many other aspects of our national life.
Indeed, it is not too much to say that to proceed very far down that
road leads to a form of anarchy where each person makes up his
own mind which of the laws established by the democratic process
he feels he can conscientiously comply with. And this is essentially
incompatible with democratic government and would undermine
the integrity of the democratic process. 499
Negre's case followed and was argued by Richard Harrington,
with Erwin Griswold again presenting the government side. Harrington made it clear from the outset that Louis Negre, unlike Guy Gil-

lette, was a religious objector to the Vietnam War.
497

00

Thomas

Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Gillette (No. 85), microfonned on The Com-

plete Oral Argurhents of the Supreme Court of the United States: 1970 Term (University Publications of America).
498 Id. at 28-29.
499 Id. at 31.
500 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(No. 325), microformed on The Complete Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
United States: 1970 Term (iJniversity Publications of America).
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Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, Alphonsus de Ligouri, tie Baltimore
Catechism, the writings of the popes, and the declarations of Church
councils all stood on Negre's side.5 0 War, Harrington made dear,

was presumptively sinful in the Catholic tradition, but could bejustifled by the satisfaction of certain criteria.50 2 The Solicitor General,
Harrington asserted, was wrong in maintaining that because Negre
did not object to all war, his objection was personal and political,
rather than religious. 503 Harrington made clear that Negre sought
equal treatment under the law.
Now, I assert... our position is quite simple; it's an equal protection position that if the Quaker on my right hand says, "I'm not

going to fight in the Vietnam War." You say, "Why not?" "Because
of my religion." If you compel the man, the Quaker[, that] would

be violating the statute, certainly. Now, my Catholic on my left
hand is not going to go. You say, "Why not?" He says, "Because of
my religion," but they are both acting under the command in the
Bible: "It's better to obey God than man." They're both acting as
taught by their religion. But you say, "Well, you're a felon and you
have to go because you are Catholic" and to the Quaker they say,
"Well, you may stay home." And the only difference is the theological imposition you find out as the hearing officer said, "My client
subscribes his beliefs to the Pope and to the Church, and the
Church doesn't teach total pacifism." And they say therefore, "you
are not exempt. You aren't a total pacifist." We think this is a manifest denial of equal protection. That Congress could abolish all exemptions, I don't purport to say, but I do say that if they can't grant
an exemption to members of one religion and deny it to another by
of his church.
picking out of this other man's religion a doctrine
50 4
The price is for doctrine; not even for conduct

Under questioning by the justices, Harrington acknowledged that
the Catholic believer made the decision to participate in war based on
the examination of his own conscience. 0 5 But this sort of conscientious scrutiny, Harrington emphasized, is formed by reference to the
501

See id. at 7.

502 Id. at 9.
503 1& at 10-11.
504 Id at 17-18.
505 Id. at 19.
The Catholic Church doesn't make the decision in any particular case ....
[I]f I kill somebody the church doesn't tell me it's self-defense or murder.
The church sets a moral standard. I must decide whether I've committed
murder or self-defense and I'm judged by God in the Catholic church,
whether I'm correct in my decision.
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teaching of the Church. "He must decide in each case whether it
meets the standards fixed by his church. It's not up to him what the
standards are. He's bound by the church standards and the church
teaching ....

50 6

The Church, Harrington continued, "isn't an anar-

chic institution; it teaches obedience to the faith and morals, and it
teaches obedience to the state except in the rare and exceptional case
07
where the commands of the state violate God's commands."
Griswold followed Harrington and began his oral argument by
insisting on the parallels between Negre and Gillette.5 0 8 The Catholic
just-war doctrine, Griswold insisted, was not "relevant." 0°9 The fact
thatjust-war teaching left the determination ofthejustice of a conflict
to the individual conscience was enough for Griswold to assert that
Catholics were outside the protection of the statute.
I'm not an expert on it, but it is, insofar as I understand it, it is the
doctrine of the Catholic Church that there is a distinction between
just and unjust wars which has theological significance. However,
the church, as I understand it, does not make that choice for the
individual. And that choice, I suggest, is on a different level than
the determination of the church between just and unjust wars. That
choice is a personal choice and if the individual choice is a selective
conscientious objection he is not covered by the statute any more
5 10
than is a Quaker who might make the same choice.
Negre, Griswold now conceded, was religiously motivated,5 1 1 but

his religious motivation was insufficient to gain the protection of the
statute.
Congress has said, "is opposed to participating in war in any form."
And the issue is whether he is opposed to all participation in all wars
and he may evidence religion as a reason for supporting the sincerity of his view that he is opposed to all wars; but if he asserts, as Mr.
Negre does, that he is not opposed to all wars, but is opposed to this
war, then he does not come within the statute, whether he is relig5 12
iously motivated or not.

506 Id.
507 Id. at 22.
508 See id. at 28. "Now, turning to this case, I think, though it is insome ways, more
complicated, it presents essentially the same legal issue as the preceding case." Id.
509 Id. at 29.
510 Id.
511 Reversing the position taken in the government brief, Griswold asserted,
"There is no doubt whatever in my mind that Mr. Negre is religiously motivated." Id.
at 30.
512 Id.
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When pressed, Griswold denied that the statute discriminated between theological perspectives. "I think we are discriminating between one belief which is opposed to participation in wrar in any form,
whether it is supported by conventional religion or not, and on the
other hand, an opposition to participation in this particular war,
whether it is supported by conventional religion or noL"5 13 Griswold
asserted, without argument, that neither the First Amendment nor
Equal Protection covered Negre's case.5 1 4 Griswold finally questioned
the relevance of the Noonan reply brief and insisted again on the irrelevance of Catholic teaching to the outcome of the case. 515 To Griswold, the matter was one of simple statutory interpretation.
In an eight-to-one decision announced on March 8, 1971, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of Gillette and Negre.r t6 Justice
Thurgood Marshall, who had himself avoided military service during
World War II in order to continue his civil-rights work, 1 7 authored a

513
514

Id. at 33.
Id.
[T]here is nothing in the constitution which requires Congress to recognize

[conscientious objection], or putting it another iwa
y it does not amount to
F
an establishment of religion or a denial of the free exercise of a religion
which is all that the First Amendment covers; nor is it an invidious discrimination insofar as there is an equal protection concept in the Fifth
Amendment.
Id.
515

Id.
516

517

Id. at 39.
I think the Catholic doctrine argument can be highlighted by the reply brief
which was filed in this case. Incidentally, it is full of learned excerpts from
Catholic authors through the years. It did occur to me how far the Court
can take judicial notice of such material, if it is relevant, which I don't think
it is, because I don't think the Court can go into the church doctrine of any
kind.
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
See JuAN WiLI.Ams, THURGOOD MLARSI-LLL: AMERC'-N

REVoLLrnomIR"

(1998).
Marshall, then in his mid-thirties, held lengthy conversations with officials of
the New York draft board to avoid being drafted. "The director of selective
service thought I was more valuable in than out," ,Marshall said. "He
thought that the Negro soldiers needed me to handle their courts-martial
and stuff like that. Which I did." Marshall added that he also had friends at
the draft board in New York who told him not to worry about being drafted
because they wanted him at the NAACP and had the situation "under
control."

123
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majority opinion that illustrated the limits of the legal liberalism of
5 18
the time.
Following the lead of the Solicitor General's brief, the majority
opinion chose not to address Gillette's and Negre's claims individually. Marshall also chose to follow the Solicitor's lead in choosing to
analyze the statutory grounds of relief first.5 19 The plain language of
the statute, Marshall began, can "bear but one meaning; that conscientious scruples relating to war and military service must amount to
conscientious opposition to participating personally in any war and all
war." 520 Legislative history, Marshall continued, supported this conclusion.5 2 1 Marshall conceded that the historical record evinced
strong support for recognizing "that fundamental principles of conscience and religious duty may sometimes override the demands of
the secular state," but he also acknowledged "countervailing consider5 22
ations" may override this support.
In a footnote, Marshall attempted to restrict the apparent applicability of ChiefJustice Hughes's dissent in Macintosh, asserting that it
should be seen strictly as a naturalization case, even though language
from the dissent was subsequently used to craft the statutory language
at issue. 525 Concluding his statutory analysis, Marshall observed that
"there is an obvious difference between . . .sincere objection to all
war, and . . . opposition to participation in a particular conflict
only.1524 Marshall declared that the holding of the Court was that
Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participating in
all war-"participation in war in any form"-and that persons who
object solely to participation in a particular war are not within the
purview of the exempting section, even though the latter objection

518 See generally Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65 (1998) (examining the Warren Court's record

with respect to the Vietnam War).
519 Gillette, 401 U.S. at 441-48.
520 Id. at 443.
521 Id. at 443-45.
522 Id. at 445.
523 Noting that "the very most that can be said about congressional reliance on the
Macintosh dissent is that Congress used it in fashioning a definition of the words 'religious training and belief.'" Marshall continued, "The claimant in Macintosh did not
seek relief from military service-his contention, and that of the dissent, was that
conscientious unwillingness to bear arms is not a disqualifying factor, under the language of the applicable loyalty oath, in a naturalization proceeding." Id. at 444-45
n.9.
524 Id. at 448.
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may have such roots in a claimant's conscience and personality that
525
it is "religious" in character.
Thus Negre's objection, grounded on a Catholic just-war tradition of ancient lineage, was reduced to a set of quotation marks
around the word "religious." Marshall's analysis of the constitutional
issues, expressing the opinion of seven members of the Court,5 2 G
similarly perfunctory. Premising his establishment analysis on the
doctrine of "neutrality," Marshall reached the conclusion that the discrimination effected by the statute was really no discrimination at
all.5 27 The statute, Marshall noted, did not, "on its face,... discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious belief, apart of
course from beliefs concerning war."528 The statute "does not single
out any religious organization or religious creed for special treat5 29
ment," Marshall opined.
Marshall then considered the contention that the statute's conferral of exempt status on theologically-based pacifists as opposed to
just-war adherents amounted to "a de facto discrimination among religions." 530 Such a contention, Marshall asserted, "cannot simply be
brushed aside," but Negre and Gillette failed to "make the requisite
showing" of impermissible discrimination.5 3 ' The statute, he noted,
served "valid purposes having nothing to do with a design to foster or
favor any sect, religion, or cluster of religions."53 2 Quoting from
Hughes's dissent in Macintosh, he observed that a principal concern of
the statute was legal recognition "that 'in the forum of conscience,
duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been maintained.'" 53 3 This "affirmative purpose" of the statute, Marshall asserted, "[is] neutral in the sense of the Establishment Clause."5
Marshall, however, subverted this claim of neutrality by giving the
Court's endorsement to the theological preference enshrined in the
statute.
'%as

In the draft area for 30 years the exempting provision has focused
on individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affiliation. The
525 Id. at 447.
526 Hugo Black concurred only as to the statutory analysis and did not reach the
constitutional question. I. at 463 (Black, J., concurring).
527 Id. at 449-50.
528 Id. at 450.
529 Id. at 451.
530 Id. at 452.
531
532

Id.
Id.

533 Id. at 453 (citation omitted).
534 Id.
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relevant individual belief is simply objection to all war, not adherence to any extraneous theological viewpoint. And while the objection must have roots in conscience and personality that are
"religious" in nature, this requirement has never been construed to
elevate conventional piety or religiosity of any kind above the imper5 35
atives of a personal faith.
In this assertion, the Court demonstrated its failure to understand
that Negre's case did not turn on issues of conventional piety, but on
real issues of theological difference with deep roots in Christian
history.

Marshall went on to treat the religious liberty claims dismissively,
failing to take account of the arguments made by counsel.
[T]he Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications
clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the
Government's valid aims.... However, the impact of conscription

on objectors to particular wars is far from unjustified. The conscription laws, applied to such persons as to others, are not designed to
interfere with any religious ritual or practice, and do not work a
penalty against any theological position. The incidental burdens
felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests that relate directly to the very im53 6
pacts questioned.
In the course of its constitutional analysis, the majority opinion
offered a series of policy justifications for upholding the statute
against Gillette's and Negre's claims.5 37 It is in this section of the
opinion that a legal realist might see the real reason for the Court's
decision. The difficulties in distinguishing between religious dissenters to a particular war and those dissenting on political grounds, the
Court suggested, "are considerable." 538 "[F] airness and even-handed
decisionmaking" are thereby threatened.5 39 Objection to a particular
war, furthermore, based on the individual's application of subjective
moral principles to inherently fluid circumstances, is "subject to nullification by changing events." 540 Citing to the Marshall Commission's
majority report, the Court saw in the petitioners' claims a threat to
democratic institutions.5 4 1 The "nature of conscription" and of "war
535 Id. at 454.
536
537
538
539
540
541

Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
See id. at 454-60.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 459-60.
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itself," the Court concluded, "require[] the personal desires and perhaps the dissenting views of those who must serve to be subordinated
42
to some degree to the pursuit of public purposes."
Only Justice William Douglas dissented from the majority opinion.5 43 Douglas, the son of a Presbyterian minister, had himself fallen
from active practice of his faith, but continued to derive spiritual satisfaction from his intense love of the outdoors. 544 Douglas's judicial
thought was sometimes influenced by his religious upbringing, as
when he wrote, "[w] e are a religious people whose institutions presup5 45
pose a Supreme Being."
A World War I veteran, Douglas left college after his freshman
year in 1917 with a strong desire to enlist in some branch of the
armed forces.5 46 Although the Marines and the embryonic naal aviation program both turned him down because of health reasonsDouglas had had polio as a child and was also color-blind-his persistence paid off and he was allowed to enlist in the Army, although he
never served overseas. 547 By 1970, however, he had come to be a
strong opponent of the Vietnam War. In a book published that year

Douglas saw in Vietnam "the lack of any apparent threat to American
interests" and sided with the youthful "dissenters" who questioned the
American involvement. 5 48 In his judicial opinions as well, Douglas
questioned the constitutionality of the war effort. 5 49
542

1d& at 459. Richard Harrington continues to object to the outcome.
Thurgood Marshall spent much of his career arguing that it ias unconstitutional to discriminate against citizens on the basis of race. I find it intellectually indefensible that Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court in Negre
found no objection to discrimination against Catholics on the basis of theological doctrine-slight doctrinal differences at best because the Quakers
deny the existence of doctrine, and Catholics like Quakers view conscience
as light from God regardless of doctrine.
Letter from Richard Harrington to CharlesJ. Reid, Jr., supra note 40, at 4.
543 See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 463-75 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
544 Seej Eis F. SIMON, INDEPENDENTJouRNW THE LIFE OF WILUAVt 0. DOUGLAS
1-2 (1980) (discussing Douglas's father); id.at 44-46 (discussing Douglas's owm
spirituality).
545 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
546 See Wn.uAfi 0. DOUGLAS, Go EASTYOUNG MAN: THE i-R.LYYnins 89-95 (1974)
(discussing his military career and World War I).
547 See id. at 91-93.
548 WmLmi 0. DOUGLAS, POINrS OF REBELUON 39 (1970).

549 Douglas, for instance, repeatedly dissented from the Court's refusal to consider petitions challenging the legality of the Vietnam War. See Hart v. United States,
391 U.S. 956, 956-60 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holmes v. United States, 391
U.S. 936, 936-49 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934,
935-39 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mitchell %.United States, 386 U.S. 972,
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Douglas's opinion alone fully engaged the issues raised by counsel for Gillette and Negre. Hearkening back to his old professor
Thomas Reed Powell, 550 Douglas saw the question presented as, "Can
a conscientious objector, whether his objection be rooted in 'religion'
or in moral values, be required to kill?" 5 51 Douglas, unlike the Court's
majority, recognized the important differences in the cases presented
by Gillette and Negre and addressed each of the cases in turn.
Douglas grounded his dissent in Gillette on a concern with identifiing the fundamental value at stake, which, in his estimation, was individual freedom of conscience.
[C]onscience and belief are the main ingredients of First Amendment rights. They are the bedrock of free speech as well as religion.... Conscience is often the echo of religious faith. But... it
may also be the product of travail, meditation, or sudden revelation
related to a moral comprehension of the dimensions of a problem,
5 52
not to a religion in the ordinary sense.
This commitment to judicial protection of the forum of conscience,
Douglas asserted, was the foundation of Hughes's dissent in Macintosh
5 53
and it should govern in Gillette's case as well.
Turning his attention to Negre's case, Douglas confessed his own
ignorance of Catholic belief and his consequent reliance on John
Noonan's reply brief. "I approach the facts of this case with some diffidence, as they involve doctrines of the Catholic Church in which I
was not raised. But we have on one of petitioner's briefs an authoritative lay Catholic scholar, Dr. John T. Noonan, Jr.... 554
972-74 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Michal R. Belknap, ConstitutionalLaw
as CreativeProblem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?, 36 CAL.

W. L. REV. 99, 108-09, 108 n.62 (1999) (collecting references).
550 On Douglas's relationship with Powell, see DouGLAs, supra note 548, at
147-48.
551 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 464 (1971) (Douglas,J, dissenting). On
Thomas Reed Powell's formulation of this question, see supranote 138 and accompanying text.
552 Id. at 465-66.
553 Id. at 465, 468. Douglas continued:
A classification of "conscience" based on a "religion" and a "conscience"
based on more generalized, philosophical grounds is equally invidious by
reason of our First Amendment standards.... This is an appropriate occasion to give content to our dictum in Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette "[F]reedom to
differ isnot limited to things that do not matter much.... The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."
Id. at 469-70 (citation omitted).

554 Id. at 470.
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Borrowing from the Noonan brief, Douglas proceeded to explicate Catholic doctrine on the subject of the Catholic conscience and
iar.55 5 A Catholic, Douglas noted, is morally obliged to participate in
the defense of the state in just wars, but is equally obliged to refi-ain

from participating in unjust conflicts.5 6 This determination, incumbent on all Catholics, is to be made "on the basis of [one's) own conscience after studying the facts." 557 Echoing Noonan's brief and

Negre's application for conscientious objector status, Douglas acknowledged that obedience to conscience was a cornerstone of Catholic teaching, as articulated by Pope Paul VI and the Second Vatican
58
Council. 5
The obligation to follow conscience has been a part of the
Church's teaching since the Acts of the Apostla, Douglas stated, and the
"duty has not changed."5 59 On the matter of participation in uarfare,
Douglas noted, "[T] he Church has provided guides."5GO Francisco de
Vitoria forbade the killing of innocents,561 and Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, in the aftermath of World War H, questioned whether war
could ever again fulfill the conditions required to bejust. -r' The Second Vatican Council was especially emphatic in its condemnation of
56 3
indiscriminate warfare against populations.
These were the principal guides Louis Negre followed in forming
his conscience. Negre himself was a devout Catholic, who submitted
to induction because he "wanted... to be sure of his comictions"
before refusing service in Vietnam.-5 It was only when faced with
direct participation in Vietnam that he felt compelled to seek conscientious objector status. His requests were denied and Negre was kept
in the service, Douglas concluded, "because his religious training and
beliefs led him to oppose only a particular wvar which according to his
555
556
557
558

See id. at 470-73.
See i& at 470.
Id at 471.
Id. at 471 n.5. Douglas quoted from Gaudiun el Spes:
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon
himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do
what is good and avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment to do this
or to shun that. For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. His dignity
lies in observing this law, and by it he will be judged.
Id. (quoting Guadium et Spes, supra note 61, § 16).
559 Id. at 472.
560 Id.
561 See id.
562 See id. at 472-73.
563 See id at 473.
564 Id. at 474.
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conscience was unjust."565 Thus mediated in a dissenting opinion of
the Supreme Court by a lapsed Presbyterian who valued the power of
religion in the life of the nation, John Noonan's reply brief came to
shape judicial teaching and vindicate the primacy of the Catholic conscience in time of war.
VI.

"No PERSON RELIGIOUSLY SCRUPULOUS OF BEARING ARMS Si-IALL
BE COMPELLED TO RENDER MILITARY SERVICE IN PERSON":
NOONAN'S MADIsoNIAN FAITH

Writing in dissent in 1988, Judge John Noonan expressed his regret that "when Congress has found a national interest to be of sufficient importance to be incorporated into federal legislation and that
legislation has conflicted with the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court of the United States has uniformly found the national
interest to outweigh the claims of conscience." 566 "Conscientious objectors to war," Noonan noted, "have been compelled to serve in the
armed forces contrary to their most deeply held principles.5' 67 Noonan continued:
Secular men and women take secular values seriously. Men and women of the world believe that the world's business is important.
When Congress elevates this business to a national priority it has
been all too easy for officers of the government and even judges to

ignore the countervailing command of the Constitution. In the Supreme Court the Constitution has been no shield for the spirit
when Congress has ordained that the spirit must yield to secular
needs.

5 68

The result in Negre is thus held up as an example of a type of secular
overreach, Congress and the Court yielding to the demands of state
and failing to comprehend the primacy of the First Amendment.
The rejoinder of the secular world to Noonan's criticism is the
statist reasoning of the majority opinion in Macintosh. The war power,
on this understanding is "well-nigh limitless. 5 69 "[I] ts exercise [] tol5' 70
erates no qualifications or limitations.
This may be the answer of the world, but it is a decidedly nonMadisonian understanding of religious freedom. It was, after all,
565

Id. at 475.

566 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859
F.2d 610, 624 (1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
567 Id. (citing Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)).
568 Id.
569 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931); see text accompanying
note 126.

570

Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 622; see also text accompanying note 127.
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James Madison who proposed as an amendment to the Constitution
that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person."5 71 Madison believed that
conscience was to be protected, even in the limit case of war, that it is
not inconsistent for a free people to conserve its freedoms even while
seeing to its national survival. John Noonan, it is evident, shares this
Madisonian faith.

571 1 AN.NALS
note 83.

OF CONG.

434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also text accompan)ing

96o
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